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ISRAEL, TURKEY, AND THE GAZA BLOCKADE 
DANIEL BENOLIEL* 
This Article provides a critical assessment of the crisis between Israel 
and Turkey, the two most prominent military powers in the Eastern 
Mediterranean region.  It concerns the Israeli blockade over the Gaza 
Strip. 
This Article critically analyzes the Turkish-led position that has been 
adopted by governments worldwide, including Arab governments, human 
rights NGOs, and several organs of the United Nations, in their joint 
critique of the Israeli blockade or siege policy towards Gaza.  This topic is 
especially pertinent given the backdrop of Israel’s recent litigious 
enforcement of its naval blockade in international waters. 
The Article separately evaluates both countries’ behaviors in these 
recent events.  It also admits the need to discretely assess Israel’s blockade 
policy over Gaza at land, air, and sea. The Article cautions against 
Turkey’s rather weak legal reasoning in framing Israel’s legal regime, ab 
initio, as belligerent occupation law, absent armed conflict towards 
Hamas-led Gaza, thereby missing the opportunity to assess Israel’s 
adherence to the laws of armed conflicts more accurately. 
This Article unveils Turkey’s oblique denial of Israel’s lawful right to 
self defense by failing to correctly analyze Israel’s application of the laws 
of armed conflicts towards Hamas. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Deterioration in Israeli–Turkish relations, two primary regional 
powers, has recently accelerated at an alarming rate.1  This became 
most noticeable during Israel’s attack on the humanitarian flotilla 
headed towards Gaza on May 31, 2010.  Organized by the Free 
Gaza Movement and the Turkish Foundation for Human Rights 
and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief, the flotilla carried 
humanitarian aid and construction materials with the intention of 
breaking the blockade of the Gaza Strip.  The Gaza raid shook 
already unstable Middle Eastern geo-politics.  Since March of 1949, 
when Israeli–Turkish relations were formalized,2 Turkey became 
the first Muslim majority country (before Iran in 1950),3 to 
recognize the State of Israel.4  Since then, Turkey and Israel, which 
 
1 See Turkey Condemns Israel Over Deadly Attack on Gaza Aid Flotilla, THE 
TELEGRAPH, May 31, 2010, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news 
/worldnews/middleeast/palestinianauthority/7789077/Turkey-condemns-
Israel-over-deadly-attack-on-Gaza-aid-flotilla.html (discussing the warning by the 
Turkish Foreign Ministry that Israeli actions have caused irreparable 
consequences in bilateral relations). 
2 See JACOB ABADI, ISRAEL’S QUEST FOR RECOGNITION AND ACCEPTANCE IN ASIA 6 
(2004) (noting that Turkey granted official recognition to the newly established 
Jewish State in 1949). 
3 Id. at 37. 
4 See Akram T. Hawas, The New Alliance: Turkey and Israel—Is It a Course 
Towards New Division of the Middle East?, at The Fourth Nordic Conference on 
Middle Eastern Studies: The Middle East in Globalizing World (Oslo, August 13–
16, 1998), available at http://www.smi.uib.no/pao/hawas.html (stating that 
“Turkey and Israel represent two different historical courses . . . the alliance 
between Turkey and Israel can easily be changed to enmity, thus making room for 
new constellations and a new regional balance/imbalance.”); see also The 
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both share concerns regarding regional instabilities in the Middle 
East, have accorded high priority to military, strategic, and 
diplomatic cooperation.  Ties have become strained since the 2008–
2009 Israel-Gaza Conflict and the raid on the Gaza Freedom Flotilla 
international naval convoy to Gaza, during which, nine Turkish 
activists were killed by Israeli troops and seven Israeli Defense 
Force (IDF) soldiers were injured.5 
Widespread international reactions followed.  These reactions 
included condemnation from governments, international 
organizations, human rights NGOs and individuals worldwide.6  
The United Nations Security Council condemned “those acts 
resulting in civilian deaths,” and demanded an impartial 
investigation of the raid from both Turkey and Israel.7  It further 
called for the immediate release of civilians held by Israel.8  The 
 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Timeline of Turkish-Israeli Relations, 
1949–2006 (2006), available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/documents 
/44edf1a5d337f.pdf (noting that Turkey recognized the state of Israel in 1949). 
5 See Ian Black & Haroon Siddique, Q&A: The Gaza Freedom Flotilla, THE 
GUARDIAN, May 31, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/31/q-
a-gaza-freedom-flotilla (showing the unlikeliness that recent talks will improve 
current Israeli-Turkish relations after the raid).  The Gaza Flotilla raid was a 
military operation against a convoy of six ships carrying 663 people, including 
pro-Palestinian activists, journalists, and humanitarians, from 37 nations.  See 
Noah Kosharek, Liel Kyzer & Barak Ravid, Israel Transfers Hundreds of Gaza Flotilla 
Activists to Airport for Deportation, HAARETZ, Jan. 6, 2010, 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israel-to-deport-all-
activists-seized-on-gaza-flotilla-1.293634 (finding that Israel had begun deporting 
foreign activists from Israel after the Flotilla raid). 
6 See Israel-OPT: Flotilla Aid to Enter Gaza under UN Supervision, IRIN, June 17 
2010, available at http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=89525 
(explaining that the UN is taking responsibility in overseeing the delivery of 
humanitarian aid that Israel seized during the Gaza raid); UN Says Aid to Gaza 
Should Be Delivered by Land, AFP, (July 23, 2010), 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jAdN25_kLyw4mSJ_
57umHQj-LZwQ (discussing the possibility of delivering aid to Gaza by land 
through specific routes to avoid further conflict with Israel). 
7 See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Condemns Acts 
Resulting in Civilian Deaths During Israeli Operation Against Gaza-Bound Aid 
Convoy, Calls for Investigation, in Presidential Statement, U.N. Press Release 
SC/9940 (May 31, 2010) (pressing for full consular access to ensure that proper 
humanitarian assistance can reach its destination). 
8 Riots Break Out Over Israel Flotilla, CBS NEWS (May 31 2010), available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=6535491n; see also Videos Timeline of 
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Turkish reaction to the raid and deaths involved much 
inflammatory rhetoric.9  Turkish president Abdullah Gül stated 
that it was the first time since World War I that Turkey had been 
attacked.10  Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan added 
that “[i]n the waters of the Mediterranean Sea, the heart of 
humanity has taken one of her heaviest wounds in history.”11  
Turkey recalled its ambassador from Israel and demanded that 
Israel acknowledge its responsibility for the attack and convey a 
public apology to the Republic of Turkey, backed by adequate 
compensation for damages resulting from Israel’s “unlawful 
attack.”12 
In February 2011, Turkey made its investigation of the flotilla 
attack public, and the United Nations Secretary-General received 
both the Turkish and Israeli reports.13  The decision to investigate 
 
Flotilla Incident as Presented by Eiland Team of Experts, 13 July 2010, ISRAEL DEFENSE 
FORCES (July 15, 2010), http://idfspokesperson.com/2010/07/15/videos-timeline-
of-flotilla-incident-as-presented-by-eiland-team-of-experts-english-version-13-
july-2010/ (presenting videos of the Gaza flotilla incident through the narration of 
the Eiland team of experts). 
9 See Sharon Roffe-Ofir, Riots in Umm al-Fahm Over Naval Raid on Gaza Aid 
Flotilla, YNET NEWS (May 31, 2010), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-
3896946,00.html (describing demonstrations by Arab-Israeli residents of Umm al-
Fahm against the Gaza raid). 
10 See supra note 7. 
11 Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkish Prime Minister’s Speech on Israeli Attack 
on Aid Flotilla (June 2, 2010), available at http://palestinechronicle.com 
/view_article_details.php?id=16018 [hereinafter Turkish Prime Minister’s 
Speech]. 
12 See TURKISH NAT’L COMM’N OF INQUIRY, REPORT ON THE ISRAELI ATTACK ON 
THE HUMANITARIAN AID CONVOY TO GAZA ON 31 MAY 2010, at 1, 8 (Feb. 12, 2011), 
available at http://gazaflotilla.delegitimize.com/statements/international-
statements/official-turkish-report-israeli-attack-on-the-humanitarian-aid-convoy-
to-gaza/ [hereinafter TURKISH NAT’L COMM’N OF INQUIRY] (noting that Israel 
launched a full-fledged attack using excessive force and disregarding any civilian 
status); Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu, Address at the 
United Nations Security Council (May 31, 2010), available at 
http://www.un.int/turkey/page403.html [hereinafter Security Council Speech] 
(noting that the Gaza flotilla attack was a crime against the United Nations). 
13 See THE TURKEL COMM’N, THE PUB. COMM’N TO EXAMINE THE MAR. INCIDENT 
OF 31 MAY 2010, PART I, 53 (2011), available at http://turkel-
committee.gov.il/files/wordocs//8707200211english.pdf [hereinafter THE ISRAELI 
TURKEL COMM.] (examining the security circumstances surrounding the Gaza raid, 
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the event was in accordance with an earlier Presidential Statement 
issued by the United Nations Security Council in June 2010 which 
called for a prompt, impartial, credible, and transparent 
investigation conforming to international standards.14  The Turkish 
official opinio juris sive necessitatis (opinion of law or necessity) was 
cited in two political speeches made by Turkey’s Foreign Minister 
Ahmet Davutoglu, who spoke at an emergency meeting of the 
United Nations Security Council,15 and by Turkish Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan during a speech to the Turkish 
Parliament.16   
The Turkish-led position based its view on three main 
arguments.  The first two—which are the focal point of this 
Article—question Israel’s legal regime as one of armed conflict 
(possibly international) absent belligerent occupation.  In startling 
contrast to the Israeli Supreme Court decision in Al-Bassiouni v. 
Prime Minister, supported by the Israeli Turkel Commission 
Report, the Turkish government, and the UNHRC Fact Finding 
Report centered their legal analysis on the applicability of 
belligerent occupation law in Gaza.17  Additional analysis was 
 
whether Israel’s actions complied with International law, and the actions carried 
out by the organizers and participants of the flotilla). 
14 See Israel/Palestine: Gaza, SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT (Feb. 2011), available at 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.6524793/k.EFFC
/February_2011brIsraelPalestine_Gaza.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2011) (discussing 
the Panel of Inquiry and  possible expected council action to follow the inquiry). 
15 See Security Council Speech, supra note 12 (addressing the civilian deaths 
associated with the Gaza raid by Israeli Defense Forces). 
16 Erdogan, supra note 11. 
17 See Human Rights Council, Report of the International Fact-Finding 
Mission to Investigate Violations of International Law, Including International 
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, Resulting From the Israeli Attacks on the 
Flotilla of Ships Carrying Humanitarian Assistance, ¶¶ 62–6, A/HRC/15/21 
(Sept. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Human Rights Council Report] (noting that despite 
unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, Israel has remained an occupying power 
in Gaza, and that occupation does not preclude the application of the 
International Covenant Civil and Political Rights); see also Human Rights Council, 
Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories: Report of the 
United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, ¶ 278, A/HRC/12/48 
(Sept. 25, 2009) [hereinafter The Goldstone Report] (discussing the events of the 
Gaza raid and stating that Israel is still the occupying power in Gaza). 
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provided by human rights organizations18 and the United Nations 
Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (a.k.a. the Goldstone 
Report) which were submitted earlier in 2009.19  Regrettably, 
almost no analytical attention was given to the applicability of 
armed conflicts law as particular law,20 or as an alternative to 
belligerent occupation law.21  The third argument put by Turkey 
and others is that the enforcement of the naval blockade in 
international waters by Israel is unlawful.  Since Israel’s naval 
blockade on the Gaza Strip is unlawful, it would follow that any 
act Israel performs as a function of this blockade is also inherently 
unlawful.22  The Israeli attack on the humanitarian aid convoy in 
international waters thus constituted a violation of the freedom of 
navigation and the safety of navigation on the high seas.23  The 
importance of this matter and its numerous implications require 
further investigation on its merits and regarding the matter’s 
inherent legal model or regime. 
 
18 See, e.g., THE ISRAELI TURKEL COMM., supra note 13, at 51 (discussing the 
testimony of Jessica Montel, a member of the Israeli Human Rights Organization 
B’Tselem). 
19 See generally The Goldstone Report, supra note 17. 
20 See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT 
OCCUPATION 33–34 (2009) (explaining that the law of belligerent occupation is 
inapplicable to non-international armed conflicts, which are often called civil 
wars); Hans-Peter Gasser, Protection of the Civilian Population, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 272 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2009) (noting that “[t]he 
law of belligerent occupation applies in international armed conflict only”); 
Richard R. Baxter, Ius in Bello Interno: The Present and Future Law, in LAW AND CIVIL 
WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 531 (John N. Moore ed., 1974) (noting that no attempt 
has been made to determine which articles of the four Geneva Convention of 1949 
could work in internal conflicts); Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project: Qualification 
of Armed Conflicts, GENEVA ACADEMY OF HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 
(Oct. 8, 2009), http://www.adh-geneva.ch/RULAC/qualification_of_armed 
_conflict.php (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) (“International humanitarian law refers to 
two different types of armed conflict: international armed conflicts and conflicts of 
a non-international character.”); see infra Part 2 (discussing the framework for the 
law of armed conflict). 
21 See infra Part 3 (discussing the law of belligerent occupation). 
22 TURKISH NAT’L COMM’N OF INQUIRY, supra note 12, at 7 (noting that any 
action stemming from Israel’s unlawful occupation act will also be unlawful); 
Security Council Speech, supra note 12 (same); Turkish Prime Minister’s Speech, 
supra note 11 (same). 
23 Id. 
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In consideration of the proper legal regime, Part 2 considers the 
first underlying proposition, specifically, whether international 
armed conflict (but possibly non-international armed conflict) 
between Israel and Hamas is per se unlawful or part of the 
belligerent occupation over Gaza.24  As argued in the 
abovementioned Turkish Report, Israel’s failure to continue its 
armed conflict with Hamas as one of international character 
precludes it from establishing a lawful naval blockade of the Gaza 
Strip.25  The Article offers, in reply, numerous reservations, both 
methodological and substantive, against the Turkish proposition.  
It explains why, especially post 9/11, the Turkish stand seems to be 
losing much explanatory power within customary international 
law and state practice and in light of tensions between Israel and 
Hamas.  The Turkish viewpoint bears witness to a rather troubling 
analytical sway by critiques of Israel’s claims that it is defending 
itself against Palestinian non-state actors.  Flat adherence to the law 
of belligerent occupation, absent non-international armed conflict, 
fails to account for Israel’s right to defend itself against Hamas’s 
deliberate attacks on civilian population since the 2005 
disengagement from Gaza.26  
Part 3 analyzes a second underlying Turkish-led proposition 
that even since Israel’s 2005 disengagement from the Gaza Strip,27 a 
 
24 See TURKISH NAT’L COMM’N OF INQUIRY, supra note 12, at 78; Security 
Council Speech, supra note 12.  The application of international rather than non-
international armed conflict in this case remains debatable.  Whether IHL applies 
in either case is outside the scope of this Article. 
25 TURKISH NAT’L COMM’N OF INQUIRY, supra note 12, at 7 (explaining that any 
act that Israel performs as a function of the blockade is unlawful); Security 
Council Speech, supra note 12 (discussing how Gaza was unlawfully ambushed); 
Turkish Prime Minister’s Speech, supra note 11 (arguing that the ambush was an 
attack against international law). 
26 See, e.g., David Kretzmer, Agora: ICJ Advisory Opinion on Construction of a 
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment 
of International Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 88 (2005) (arguing for an 
equivalent methodological critique of the ICJ 2004 Advisory Opinion concerning 
the military necessity and defense concerns Israel presented in justifying the 
Separation Wall); Christian J. Tams, Light Treatment of a Complex Problem: The Law 
of Self-Defense in the Wall Case, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 963, 971 (2005) (arguing that the 
ICJ opinion against the legality of the Separation Wall failed to consider Israel’s 
particular problem of self-defense against non-state actors). 
27 In February 2005, the Israeli government implemented a unilateral 
“disengagement plan,” whereby all Israeli settlements and military bases in the 
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state of belligerent Israeli occupation over the Gaza Strip still 
continues to take place,28 notwithstanding Gaza’s election of 
Hamas over Fatah.29  It is widely recognized by the international 
community and the United Nations that Israel continues to retain 
effective control over the Gaza Strip and as the occupying power 
there.30  As a result, Israel cannot lawfully impose a military 
blockade on the Gaza Strip.31  As such, any actions based on this 
blockade become unlawful.32  The Article further presents 
numerous reservations towards this incomplete legal reasoning. 
Part 4 critically analyzes a final argument put forth by Turkey 
that the law of belligerent occupation implies an absence of non-
international armed conflict.  It states that an alleged violation of 
 
Gaza Strip would be dismantled, and all Israeli troops and settlers withdrawn.  
See ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ISRAEL’S DISENGAGEMENT PLAN: 2005 
(2005), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Facts+About+Israel 
/Israel+in+Maps/Israels+Disengagement+Plan-+2005.htm (describing Israel’s 
disengagement from the Gaza strip as a demonstration of Israel’s willingness to 
make sacrifices in pursuit of peace).  See also Yuval Shany, Binary Law Meets 
Complex Reality: The Occupation of Gaza Debate, 41 ISR. L. REV. 68, 70 (2008) 
[hereinafter Shany, Binary Law] (illustrating four fundamental tensions that 
hamper the law of occupation’s application in factually complicated situations); 
see also Yuval Shany, Faraway, So Close: The Legal Status of Gaza After Israel’s 
Disengagement, 8 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 369, 369 (2005) (analyzing the 
conflicting positions on the legal status of Gaza and identifying the relevant legal 
conditions governing the beginning and end of occupation). 
28 See supra note 25 & accompanying text; see also infra Part 3. 
29 The result was two governments: a Hamas government in Gaza, and a 
Fatah government under the Abbas presidency in the West Bank.  See Eli Lake, 
Hamas Takes Over Gaza Security Services, N.Y. SUN, June 15, 2007, available at 
http://www.nysun.com/article/56622 (discussing Hamas’s takeover of CIA-
trained Gaza Security Services); Sherifa Zuhur, U.S. ARMY WAR C., Hamas and 
Israel: Conflicting Strategies of Group-Based Politics 38 (2008), available at 
http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/zuhur.pdf (considering the changing fortune of 
the Palestinian movement and recent outcomes of Israeli strategies aimed at this 
group and Palestinian nationalism). 
30 See Lake, supra note 29. 
31 See TURKISH NAT’L COMM’N OF INQUIRY, supra note 12, at 8 (arguing that 
Israel’s blockade of Gaza is illegal by definition because Israel is recognized as the 
occupying power of Gaza by the United Nations and the international 
community); see also Security Council Speech, supra note 12 (urging the Security 
Council of the United Nations to condemn Israel’s blockade of Gaza); Turkish 
Prime Minister’s Speech, supra note 11 (calling on the international community to 
condemn the Israeli blockade of Gaza). 
32 See TURKISH NAT’L COMM’N OF INQUIRY, supra note 12.  
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human rights by Israel, as part of its blockade policy in Gaza, 
further solidifies the conclusion that Israel is belligerently 
occupying Gaza.33 
2. THE ABSENCE OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 
2.1. The Positive Framework 
A first critique to the Turkish-led stand considers the law of 
armed conflicts’ applicability in the Israel-Hamas conflict since the 
2005 disengagement.  At the outset, Turkey34 and the UNHRC Fact 
Finding Report35 classify Gaza as an Israeli occupied territory, 
subject to the law enforcement model.  The Report could then be 
said to authorize the use of force to restore and maintain law and 
order.36  The choice in actual fact ignores the particular or parallel 
role of the law of armed conflicts.  This same stance has been 
largely adopted by leading international organizations, which all 
seem to follow the Turkish position.  The chief organizations that 
adopt this stance are the United Nations,37 the International 
Commission of the Red Cross,38 Human Rights Watch,39 Amnesty 
 
33 See, e.g., Security Council Speech, supra note 12. 
34 See supra note 25 & accompanying text. 
35 See Human Rights Council Report, supra note 17, at 15.  The UNHRC 
Report consistently follows the findings of The Goldstone Report, supra note 17, ¶ 
278. 
36 See International Committee of the Red Cross, Convention (IV) respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, (October 1907), 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/195 (describing an occupying nation’s right to 
use power to ensure public order and safety).  Alternatively, a self-defense claim 
may be deemed impermissible if the occupation in itself is considered equivalent 
to aggression in the backdrop of legitimate resistance. 
37 See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories 
occupied since 1967, Human Rights Council, A/HRC/16/72 (Jan. 10, 2010) (by 
Richard Falk), available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/498/94/PDF/N1049894.pdf?OpenElement 
(addressing Israel’s compliance with its obligations under international law as an 
occupying power in the Palestinian Territories since 1967). 
38  International Committee of the Red Cross, The Occupied Palestinian 
Territories: Dignity Denied (Dec. 13, 2007), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/palestine-report-131207 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2011) (reporting on the hardships Palestinians face because 
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International,40 and prominent Israeli human rights 
organizations.41  A second, rather circumstantial approach holds 
that at least some Israeli military operations in Gaza should be 
viewed as an armed conflict based on the particular scale and 
intensity.42 
This modeling of the Israeli-Hamas conflict reverts to law 
enforcement standards, not the laws on the use of force or, in 
particular, armed conflict.  Those laws are based on the 
humanitarian Regulations annexed to The Hague Convention IV of 
1907, the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and relevant provisions 
of customary law, including those codified in Additional Protocol I 
to the four Geneva Conventions in the occupied Gaza Strip. 
 
they are prevented from attaining basic necessities and conducting basic daily 
activities). 
39 See Human Rights Watch, “I Lost Everything” Israel’s Unlawful Destruction of 
Property During Operation Cast Lead at 117 (May 13, 2010), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/05/13/i-lost-everything (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2011) (detailing Israel’s destruction of property by geographic region 
during Operation Cast Lead and Israel’s international legal obligations under the 
Laws of Occupation); Human Rights Watch, Israel: ‘Disengagement’ Will Not End 
Gaza Occupation (Oct. 28, 2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/english/docs 
/2004/10/29/isrlpa9577.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) (arguing that Israel’s plans 
to remove its troops and settlements from the Gaza Strip will not end the 
occupation of the territory because Israel will retain control over Gaza’s borders, 
coastline and airspace, launch incursions at will, and wield overwhelming power 
over Gaza’s economy and access to trade). 
40 Amnesty International, Document—Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territories: 
The Conflict in Gaza: A Briefing on Applicable Law, Investigations, and Accountability, 
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE15/007/2009/en 
/4c407b40-e64c-11dd-9917-ed717fa5078d/mde150072009en.html#1 (detailing the 
rules governing hostilities, international human rights law, international criminal 
law, among others, between Israel and the Occupies Territories). 
41 See, e.g., Gisha: Legal Center for Freedom of Movement, Disengaged 
Occupiers: The Legal Status of Gaza (Jan. 2007), available at 
http://www.gisha.org/UserFiles/File/Report%20for%20the%20website.pdf 
(analyzing the legal status of Gaza in relation to Israel’s claim that it owes no 
obligations to the residents of Gaza post-disengagement); B’Tselem, The Gaza 
Strip—Israel’s Obligations Under International Law, available at 
http://www.btselem.org/gaza_strip/israels_obligations (detailing Israel’s 
obligation to residents of the Gaza Strip based on international conventions, 
international humanitarian law, and international human rights law). 
42 See, e.g., Amnesty International, supra note 40, at 7. 
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To begin with, in line with the jus ad bellum theme of this 
Article, the International Court of Justice’s 2004 Advisory Opinion 
on the Legal Consequences of the Wall, supports the law enforcement 
model.43  The court ruled that the right to self-defense under 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter applies solely against 
foreign states and in conflicts that take place in occupied 
territories.44 
Furthermore, per the jus in bello (justice in war) use of force 
analysis, this reasoning is problematic.  In contrast to the Turkish 
position, the Israeli Turkel Report, the Israeli Supreme Court 
decision in Al-Bassiouni v. Prime Minister, and Israel’s position 
presented during Court proceedings, all show that Israel is subject 
to the rules of customary international law that apply in armed 
conflicts.45 
In support of the latter position, critique to the Turkish-led 
alternative relates to the following.  Even if one acknowledges that 
a state of belligerent occupation continues to exist in Gaza since the 
2005 disengagement, a well-accepted observation provides that the 
law of belligerent occupation is particular in customary law to 
international armed conflict and thus offers no inconsistency.46  
Notwithstanding the broad customary legal validity of the said 
observation, the Israeli Turkel Committee,47 as well as the Israeli 
Supreme Court have upheld this position since the 2005 
 
43 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 139 (July 9) [hereinafter ICJ 
Advisory Opinion Concerning Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall] 
(finding that the construction of a wall by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories is contrary to international law and stating the legal consequences 
arising from that illegality). 
44 The International Court of Justice added that as the threat to Israel 
originated within the occupied territory Israel could not invoke its right of self-
defense under Article 51 to the U.N. Charter.  Id. at 194. 
45 See THE ISRAELI TURKEL COMM., supra note 13, at 50, section 45, referring to 
HCJ 9132/07 Gaber Al-Bassiouni v. The Prime Minister [Jan. 30, 2008] 
(unpublished).  See the Israeli Supreme Court website for an official English 
translation at: http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files_eng/07/320/091/n25 
/07091320.n25.pdf. [‘The Al-Bassiouni case’], para. 14. 
46 See supra note 20 (discussing the law of belligerent occupation). 
47 See THE ISRAELI TURKEL COMM, supra note 13, at 53 (“Therefore, in alignment 
with the Supreme Court of Israel, the Commission takes the position that Israel’s 
effective control of the Gaza Strip ended when the disengagement was completed 
in 2005.”). 
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disengagement.48  As a result, in addition to the provisions 
protecting persons in occupied territories found in the 1907 Hague 
Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention, the rules on the 
methods and means of warfare will be applicable.  The law of 
armed conflicts, alongside the self-defense doctrine, hence governs 
the use of force relating to the conduct of hostilities in the 
backdrop of belligerent occupation, and is subject to the criteria 
and thresholds of armed conflicts law.49 
But on what critical grounds does this approach trump the 
Turkish-led reading of the Israel-Hamas hostilities in the backdrop 
of the Gaza Blockade? 
2.2. In Self-Defense against Non-State Actors 
The first critique responds to an argument set initially by the 
UNHRC Report stating that Israel has failed to claim the right of 
belligerent interdiction or the wider claim of self-defense.  In 
separation from the international humanitarian law critique herein, 
it is disturbing to witness Turkey’s lack of admittance of Israel’s 
underlying right to use force against Hamas, while preliminarily 
negating the former’s right to self-defense per se.50  Turkey has 
 
48 See, e.g., The Al-Bassiouni case, supra note 45, para. 12 (“We should point 
out in this context that since September 2005 Israel no longer has effective control 
over what happens in the Gaza Strip.  Military rule that applied in the past in this 
territory came to an end by a decision of the government . . . .“); HCJ 769/02 Pub. 
Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel, para. 16 [unpublished, Dec. 11, 
2005] [hereinafter Targeted Killing case], http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng 
/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf (“The general, principled starting point is 
that between Israel and the various terrorist organizations active in Judea, 
Samaria, and the Gaza Strip . . . a continuous situation of armed conflict has 
existed since the first intifada.”).  
49 See Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights 
Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 28 (2004) (exploring the 
interface between using human rights law and international humanitarian law to 
assess the use of force during armed conflict); see also Brian D. Tittemore, 
Belligerents in Blue Helmets: Applying International Humanitarian Law to United 
Nations Peace Operations, 33 STAN. J. INT’L L. 61, 65 (1997) (“The existence of an 
armed conflict is a precondition to the application of international humanitarian 
law; and the nature of the armed conflict determines the legal regime that will 
govern.”). 
50 See Human Rights Council Report, supra note 17, at 14 (“Given the 
evidence at the Turkel Committee, it is clear that there was no reasonable 
suspicion that the Flotilla posed any military risk of itself.  As a result, no case 
could be made for intercepting the vessels in the exercise of belligerent rights or 
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argued twofold.  Firstly, it has argued against Israel’s right to self-
defense and has done so rather vaguely.  It has stated this without 
clarifying whether its claims refer in particular to the siege policy 
over Gaza, the naval blockade per se, the hostilities on board 
Flotilla ships on the high seas, the capturing, interrogating, and 
arresting procedures of participants of the Flotilla—or any 
combination of matters thereof.51  Nevertheless, the broad Turkish 
argument could remain relevant for these separate contexts.  
Secondly, Turkey has criticized the international community, 
which “has been a witness to this humanitarian tragedy for years” and 
has supposedly failed to act against Israel.52  Both of these Turkish 
arguments are refutable as follows. 
In practice, much explanatory power for the critique of the 
Turkish position derives from the fact that the self-defense doctrine 
towards non-state actors has been drastically altered and amended 
since 9/11 and currently may implicate the use of force doctrine 
altogether.53  In theory, as will be further explained, following the 
determination that a situation of armed conflict exists given 
Hamas-Israel hostilities, it would no longer be relevant to justify 
 
Article 51 self-defence.”).  For Turkey’s position, see Security Council Speech, 
supra note 12, and Turkish Prime Minister’s Speech, supra note 11.  
51 See Security Council Speech, supra note 12 (stating broadly that the “use of 
force is not an option unless clearly stated in law” and that “[t]he doctrine of self-
defense does not in any way justify the actions taken by the Israeli forces”); see also 
Turkish Prime Minister’s Speech, supra note 11 (“At the same time on the ships 
were no other passengers than civilians and aid volunteers.  The ships were flying 
white flags.  Despite all those conditions the ships were subject to an armed 
attack.”).  
52 Security Council Speech, supra note 12 (emphasis added).  
53 For commentary in support, see Y. DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-
DEFENSE, 204–08 (2005); Sean D. Murphy, Self Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory 
Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the ICJ?, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 62, 67–70 (2005) (“The most 
dramatic example of invoking Article 51 in response to an attack by a nonstate 
actor followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  The next day, the 
Security Council passed Resolution 1368 . . . .”); Jordan J. Paust, Use of Armed Force 
Against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 533, 533–34 
(2002) (focusing on issues involving executive war powers and asking if the 
President of the United States needs authority from Congress “to engage in 
preemptive strikes against other states”); Thomas M. Franck, Editorial Comments, 
Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 839, 840 (2001) (asking if 
the United States’ use of military force against the Taliban and Al-Qeada in 
Afghanistan is lawful under the U.N. Charter).  For a pre-9/11 view, see Oscar 
Schachter, The Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases, 11 HOUS. J. INT’L 
L. 309, 311(1989) (discussing whether, as a matter of international law, terrorist 
bases may be attacked in another country).  
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the jus in Bello analysis based on the jus ad Bellum use of force 
doctrine.54  Yet despite the focus of this Article on jus in Bello, it 
nonetheless bears mention that to the extent that jus ad Bellum 
would be relevant, Israel should be permitted to exercise its 
inherent right of self-defense against Hamas hostilities.  This 
proposition is based on several arguments in critique of the 
Turkish-led position to the contrary. 
For a start, international recognition of the right to self-defense 
in continuation has been generated post-9/11 as state practice in 
numerous occasions.  Notably, this right was invoked by Security 
Council Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001), in favor of the 
‘War on Terror’ against Al Qaeda, the United States’ invocation of 
Article 51 to the United Nations Charter in order to justify the 
bombing of Al Qaeda bases in Sudan and Afghanistan,55 and the 
Russian extraterritorial forceful response to Islamist terror 
networks.56  These responses could logically also apply to the 
Israeli-Hamas conflict.  It should be further noted that such state 
practice has been echoed in support of Israel’s right to self -defense 
against Hamas, and was declared by:  the United States Secretary 
General, the current United States Secretary of State,57 leading 
European countries including Italy, Germany, and the Czech 
 
54 See Iain Scobbie, Words My Mother Never Taught Me—“In Defense of the 
International Court,” 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 76, 83 (2005) (“Palestine saw the Israeli claim 
to self-defense as involving an illegitimate elision of legal categories, ‘an 
impermissible confusion’ between the jus in bello and the jus ad bellum, which must 
be kept separate . . . .”) (footnote omitted).  
55 See generally Jules Lobel, Colloquy, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist 
Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 537 (1999) 
(analyzing the method by which the international community measures states’ 
assertions of facts as a way to justify their use of force in response to a terrorist 
attack). 
56 For additional discussion, see Tams, supra note 26, at 972 (“States that have 
exercised or asserted a right to exercise self-defence against armed attacks by non-
state actors (even if their conduct could not be attributed to another state under 
the Nicaragua or Tadic tests) include Iran, Russia, and the United States, while 
Israel maintained its position.”) (citations omitted).  See generally Antonio Cassese, 
Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law, 12 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 993, 995–96 (2001) (discussing “the impact of the 11 September 
tragedy on the law of self-defence” and noting that the “UN Security Council 
unanimously passed a resolution on the terrorist strikes (Res. 1368)”).  
57 See Clinton Says Israel has Right to Defend Itself, REUTERS, Jan. 27, 2009, 
available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUKTRE50Q4QE20090127 
(discussing Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s support of Israel’s right to self-
defense). 
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Republic (currently chairing the Presidency of the European 
Union), the current European Union President,58 and numerous 
United Nations high ranked officials.59 
Secondly, the International Court of Justice Judge Kooijmans 
explicitly stated that the hostile attacks on Israel by Palestinians 
were unintentional.60  In other words, as violence originated in 
Israel’s occupied territories, the ensuing conflict was said to be 
unintentional whereby no justification presumably remained for 
Israel to defend itself within the scope of Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter.  Yet, in our recent case, Hamas clearly acted 
intentionally in its outward violation of international humanitarian 
law, thereby further weakening the relevancy of the International 
Court’s Advisory Opinion.  Unlike the International Court’s 
position over the Separation Wall, Judge Richard Goldstone, the 
former Chair of the UNHRC Fact Finding Goldstone Report, has 
already categorically reaffirmed the intentionality found in the 
actions by Hamas towards Israeli civilians.61  Earlier on, Professor 
 
58 Tamas Berzi, European Reactions to Israel’s Gaza Operation, TAKEAPEN.ORG 
(Jan. 29, 2009), available at http://www.takeapen.org/Takeapen 
/Templates/showpage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=84&FID=1681 (“[T]he 
Presidency of the Council of the European Union condemned both the Israeli air 
raids and the Palestinian rocket strikes on Israel from Gaza and called for an 
immediate end to these activities.”).  But see, e.g., Human Rights Council 
Continues to Discuss Crisis Situation in Gaza, U.N. Press Release (Jan. 9, 2009) 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/8E8BAE03D7CDF9E8C1
257539006C5F6B (statements of Bolivia and the Arab League with regard to 
human rights violations in Gaza). 
59 See Gaza: UN Official Asks Israel to Use Restraint in Responding to Rocket 
Attacks, UN NEWS CENTRE, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID= 
37143&Cr=palestin&Cr1= (last visited Nov. 13, 2011) (quoting Robert Serry, a 
U.N. Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, as saying “Israel has 
a right to self-defence consistent with international humanitarian law”); Douglas 
Hamilton, U.N. Condemns Gaza Militants Over Rocket Attacks, REUTERS, Dec. 22, 
2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/22/us-israel-gaza-un-
idUSTRE6BL37Y20101222 (detailing rocket and mortar firings in Gaza). 
60 See David Kretzmer, supra note 26, at 96 n.62 (citing Judge Kooijmans’s 
opinion that “when violence originates in occupied territory, the ensuing conflict” 
is “noninternational”); ICJ Advisory Opinion concerning Legal Consequences of 
the Construction of a Wall, supra note 43, at 152–53, paras. 35–36 (considering how 
to address the issue of the legality of Israel’s construction of a barrier wall to 
prevent attacks). 
61 See Richard Goldstone, Reconsidering the Goldstone Report on Israel and War 
Crimes, WASH. POST, Apr. 1  2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions 
/reconsidering-the-goldstone-report-on-israel-and-war-crimes/2011/04/01 
/AFg111JC_print.html (“That the crimes allegedly committed by Hamas were 
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Irwin Cotler—a former Canadian Minister of Justice, as along with 
Human Rights Watch,62 and Amnesty International63—affirmed 
that between the years 2000 through 2008 there was “almost no 
comparable example” anywhere in today’s world of a group such as 
Hamas that “so systematically [and deliberately] violates 
international” law related to armed conflicts.64  Hamas leaders 
themselves publically declare the affectivity of their deliberate 
hostile activities towards Israeli civilians.65  No relevancy remains, 
therefore, to the International Court Advisory Opinion reservation 
as to the intentionality, and lack thereof, in applying humanitarian 
law provisions or self-defense in the present case. 
Thirdly, still on the jurisprudence of self-defense, the 
International Court of Justice and the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee have in fact admitted, elsewhere, Israel’s right to 
self-defense.  To begin with, the Court reads Article 51 to require 
an armed attack that ‘originates . . . outside [the] territory’ of the state 
claiming to act in self-defense.  Hostile attacks on Israel from the 
partially controlled-West Bank were not sufficiently ‘external’ to 
 
intentional goes without saying—its rockets were purposefully and 
indiscriminately aimed at civilian targets.”).  Judge Goldstone further clarifies that 
in contradiction to policy by Hamas, Israel’s policy indicates that: “[w]hile the 
investigations published by the Israeli military and recognized in the U.N. 
committee’s report have established the validity of some incidents that we 
investigated in cases involving individual soldiers, they also indicate that civilians 
were not intentionally targeted as a matter of policy.”  Id. 
62 See Letter to the Leaders of Hamas, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 28, 2006), 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/01/28/letter-leaders-hamas (urging the 
leaders of Hamas to “announce publicly that [their] organization will not use 
lethal force to target civilians or cause indiscriminate harm to civilians”). 
63 See Occupied Palestinian Territories: Torn Apart by Factional Strife, AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL (Oct. 24, 2007), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library 
/asset/MDE21/020/2007/en/6609e419-d363-11dd-a329-2f46302a8cc6 
/mde210202007en.html (culminating in 2007, “[b]oth Fatah and Hamas security 
forces and armed groups committed grave human-rights abuses and displayed a 
flagrant disregard for the safety of the civilian population”). 
64 Haviv Rettig Gur, Law Professor: Hamas is a War Crimes ‘Case Study,’ THE 
JERUSALEM POST, Jul. 11 2011, http://www.jpost.com/LandedPages 
/PrintArticle.aspx?id=129168 (quoting Professor Irwin Cotler) (emphasis added). 
65 For excerpts from a 2007 interview with former Hamas foreign minister 
Mahmoud A-Zahar, see The Hamas Terror War Against Israel, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF 
FOREIGN AFF. (Mar. 2011) http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-
+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Missile+fire+from+Gaza+on
+Israeli+civilian+targets+Aug+2007.htm (“We are succeeding with the rockets.  
We have no losses and the impact on the Israeli side is so much.”).  
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trigger a right of self-defense in the sense of Article 51.  Instead, 
they emanated from an area over which ‘Israel exercises control.’66  
This in turn served as a basis for distinguishing the Wall case from 
the situation in Gaza where Israel possessed a more limited form of 
control post-2005 disengagement.  No Turkish adherence to this 
fundamental fact has been made.  This distinction between the 
degree of control over the West Bank and the post-disengagement 
Gaza Strip also underlies Security Council Resolutions 1368 (2001) 
and 1373 (2001), in which the Security Council needed to deal with 
terrorist attacks emanating ‘from outside,’ i.e., from an area not 
controlled by the victim state, such as Israel. 
Fourthly, the International Court of Justice, in its 
abovementioned 2004 Advisory Opinion, is inconsistent in itself.  
In the backdrop of its rejection of Israel’s right to self-defense, 
according to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and per 
Israel’s case for a separation fence bordering the West Bank (as in 
paragraph 139), the Court also rather uneasily ruled otherwise.67  
And so, in paragraph 141, the Court recognizes Israel’s twofold 
self-defense related legal rights.  The first is Israel’s right to act 
against the hostilities initiated by Hamas against Israeli civilians.68  
The second is Israel’s right and “indeed the duty” to take proactive 
action and adequately respond:  “The fact remains that Israel has to 
face numerous indiscriminate and deadly acts of violence against its 
civilian population.  It has the right, and indeed the duty, to respond in 
order to protect the life of its citizens.”69  At no other point in the 
Advisory Opinion does the Court take on mitigating jurisprudence 
per this rather deep-seated inconsistency. 
 
66 The 1995 Interim Oslo Accords leave Israel with security and civil control 
over extended areas, in particular Areas B & C, of the West Bank, continuously at 
the time of the ICJ Advisory Opinion decision.  See Israeli-Palestinian Interim 
Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, art. XIII(2), (7)–(8) Sept. 28, 1995, 
36 I.L.M. 557.  For the Court’s conclusion, see ICJ Advisory Opinion concerning 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 43, at 194, para. 138. 
67 To be sure, International Court held that the requirements of necessity 
were not met.  Israel has not argued for necessity per the Palmer Report, and 
rightly so.  For necessity requirements, see Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, art. 25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 
(Jan. 28, 2002).   
68 See ICJ Advisory Opinion concerning Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall, supra note 43, at 195,  para. 141 (stating Israel’s right to 
protect the lives of its citizens). 
69 Id. (emphasis added). 
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In addition, even in the backdrop of a harsh critique against 
Israel’s choice of conduct per the Gaza Flotilla events, the UNHRC 
Fact-Finding Report positively acknowledged that an armed 
conflict exists between Israel and Hamas.70  The Mission did so 
while considering that “the naval blockade was implemented in 
support of the overall closure regime.”71  “As such it was part of a 
single disproportionate measure of armed conflict” which the 
commission found to be lopsided.72  Yet in so doing, it further 
affirmed that the former holds a right of self-defense against the 
latter.73  It then stated that “[t]he firing of rockets and other munitions 
of war into Israeli territory from Gaza constitutes serious violations of 
international law and of international humanitarian law.”74  The 
UNHRC Report supposedly does affirm in this case referral to the 
use of force doctrine comprehensively, incorporating jus ad bello 
justifications, even in territories considered to be occupied, such as 
the Gaza Strip.  In continuation, recently, Chair of the Goldstone 
Report, South African jurist Richard Goldstone, joined post-factum 
the opinion that “Israel, like any other sovereign nation, has the right 
and obligation to defend itself and its citizens against attacks from abroad 
and within.”75  With that, UNHRC follows the present bend from 
the use of force doctrine, thereby de facto admitting Israel’s right to 
self-defense against Hamas in Gaza. 
Fifthly, further reservation from the Turkish-led position is 
challenged, per the use of force doctrine at large, with a 2008 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
key decision in the Boskoski and Tarculovski case.  Referring to the 
test established in the Tadic case, ICTY considered crimes 
committed in connection with a conflict in Macedonia, between 
 
70 See Human Rights Council Report, supra note 17, at 14, para. 59 (stating 
that the interception of the flotilla by Israel was a “measure of armed conflict” and 
the attack “must be viewed in the context of the ongoing problems between the 
Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority”). 
71 Id.  
72 Id. 
73 See id. (suggesting that if the flotilla had posed a security threat to Israel 
then Israel’s actions may have been proportionate).  
74 Id. at 53, para. 263 (emphasis added).  
75 Goldstone, supra note 61 (emphasis added).  To be sure, Judge Goldstone 
stated that crimes “committed by Hamas were intentional [and] goes without 
saying—its rockets were purposefully and indiscriminately aimed at civilian 
targets.”  Id.  
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government forces and the Albanian National Liberation Army 
(NLA).  In what should be said to support the Israeli Supreme 
Court stance towards Hamas’ attacks on Israeli civilians, the Trial 
Chamber clarified that terrorist acts, as any non-terrorist acts, may 
constitute intense and “protracted [armed] violence” by the NLA, 
that is “especially where they require the engagement of the armed forces 
in hostilities.”76 
The Tribunal initially observed whether “the engagement of 
both parties in hostilities” was based upon acts that are 
“perpetrated in isolation or as part of a protracted campaign.”77  It 
then rendered the conflict an “internal [non-international] armed 
conflict.”78  The case should serve as yet another important 
milestone in the adoption of its underlying jurisprudence, 
especially post 9/11. 
2.3. The Triviality of the Intensity Threshold 
The second critique to the Turkish and UNHRC Report’s 
classification of the Gaza Strip as occupied territory, absent an 
armed conflict, considers the intensity threshold for the mentioned 
hostilities.79  The critique, in essence, differs from the 
discontinuous and rather contextual abovementioned approach by 
Human Rights organizations, such as Amnesty International, 
which admitted the sustainability of an armed conflict solely for 
particular and discontinuous hostilities.  The intensity threshold, to 
be sure, presides within armed conflicts jurisprudence alongside a 
second one, namely the level of organization by the parties of non-
 
76 Prosecutor v. Boskoski & Tarculovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, 
para. 190 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jul 10, 2008) [hereinafter 
Boskoski and Tarculovski Trial Judgment].  
77 Id. para. 185.  
78 Id. para. 292.  
79 See Prosecutor v. Limaj & Bala, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, para. 90 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005) (discussing how to 
assess the “intensity of a conflict,” highlighting factors like the “seriousness of 
attacks” and “whether there has been an increase in armed clashes”); Prosecutor 
v. Haradinaj & Balaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, para. 49 (Int’l Crim Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008) (“These indicative [intensity] factors include 
the number, duration and intensity of individual confrontations; the type of 
weapons and other military equipment used; the number and calibre of munitions 
fired; the number of persons and type of forces partaking in the fighting . . . .”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
05 BENOLIEL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2011  9:31 PM 
634 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 33:2 
international armed conflicts.80  Given the takeover of Hamas over 
the Gaza Strip during 2007 and the establishment of a despotic 
Hamas Government backed by its para-military wing (the Izz al-
Din al-Qassam Brigades) this criterion remains indisputable. 
By interpretation of the intensity threshold, the ICTY Haradinaj 
Trial Chambers stated a number of secondary considerations to be 
considered ensemble, sufficient for the intensity criteria.  They are 
sub-classified threefold and serve in reply to the present critique 
over the Turkish-led analytical disregard of the degree of this 
conflict’s intensity.  They are as follows:  the first is the duration 
and intensity of individual confrontations.81  The second is the type 
of weapons used and the number of people involved and 
affected.82  The third measurement of the intensity criteria is the 
means of ending an armed conflict.83 
To begin with, as for duration and intensity of individual 
confrontations, the ICTY has already found it to satisfy “periodic 
armed clashes” ranging from three to seven days, taking place over 
“a widespread and expanding geographic area.”84  In the case of 
the Israeli-Hamas hostilities, since the massive outbreak of 
hostilities in October 2000, also known as the Al Aqsa Intifada, 
until the beginning of the military operation against Hamas 
 
80  The Haradinaj Trial Chamber additionally upheld that armed conflict 
would exist solely between parties that are “sufficiently organized to confront 
each other with military means.”  Prosecutor v. Haradinaj & Balaj, Case No. IT-04-
84-T, Judgment, para. 60 (Int’l Crim Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008).  
81 For intensity based on the ongoing conflict and not the immediate time of 
events, see Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion & Judgment, para. 
566 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997) (analyzing the events 
in Prijedor in the context of the larger conflict between “the Government of the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb forces”) and Prosecutor 
v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, para. 186 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998).  For intensity based on the UNSC,  see Tadic 
Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion & Judgment, para. 567 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997) (describing the sanctions imposed on the Former 
Republic of Yugoslavia by the United Nations) and Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case 
No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, para. 190 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Nov. 16, 1998) (construing “control” as the “material ability of a commander to 
punish”). 
82 For intensity based on the type of weapons used and arming efforts, see 
Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal, para. 31 (Int’l Crim. Trib for the Former Yugoslavia June 16, 2004).   
83 Id. paras. 26–28. 
84 Prosecutor v. Limaj & Bala, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, para. 168 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005).  
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codenamed “Operation Cast Lead,” which took place on December 
2008, Hamas had launched rocket and mortar shell fire from the 
Gaza Strip to Israel over 1,000 times.85  In 2007, Hamas accelerated 
the military buildup of its para-military wing.86  Between June 2007 
and June 2008, Hamas fired approximately three thousand times, 
which. This also triggered an Israeli military operation against 
Hamas codenamed “Operation Cast Lead,” which took place 
between December 2008 and January 2009.87  Israel’s stated aim has 
been to stop Hamas rocket attacks on southern Israel.88  During 
that time, the fighting was undoubtedly sufficiently intense 
enough to amount to an armed conflict under IHL, with Hamas 
firing 1,251 rockets and mortar shells at Israel for a period of 
twenty-two days. 89  In its parliamentary report and elsewhere, 
Turkey systematically has avoided mentioning these regrettable, 
intense events and has remarkably avoided any analysis of Israel’s 
rather trivial military necessity herein. 
Secondly, intensity in an armed conflict is measured also by the 
type of weapons used and the number of involved and affected 
people.  ICTY further exempts events that do not exceed the 
capacity of traditional policing forces such as “violent 
demonstrations, students throwing stones at the police, bandits 
holding persons hostage for ransom, or the assassination of 
government officials for political reasons”; ICTY did not define 
 
85 See The Hamas terror war against Israel, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Hamas 
+war+against+Israel/Missile+fire+from+Gaza+on+Israeli+civilian+targets+Aug+
2007.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2011) (discussing the significant reduction in rocket 
fire in the two years following Operation Cast Lead). 
86 In an interview with former Hamas foreign minister Mahmoud A-Zahar 
on August 21, 2007, he further clarified: “We are succeeding with the rockets.  We 
have no losses and the impact on the Israeli side is so much.”  Id. 
87 See, e.g., ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, THE “GAZA WAR”: A STRATEGIC 
ANALYSIS, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 10 (Feb. 2, 2009) (draft), 
available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090202_gaza_war.pdf 
(discussing the beginning of Operation Cast Lead following within days of a 
major rocket attack by Hamas). 
88 See id. at 38 (discussing the IDF’s several military, including the weakening 
of Hamas and the reduction and end of the threat from rocket fire). 
89 See The Operation in Gaza: Factual and Legal Aspects, ISRAELI MINISTRY OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Jul. 29, 2009), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-
+Obstacle+to+Peace/Hamas+war+against+Israel/Operation_in_Gaza-
Factual_and_Legal_Aspects.htm (discussing legal issues arising out of The 
Operation in Gaza between December 2008 and January 2009). 
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these forms of domestic violence as “armed conflicts.”90  The 
armed forces in the paramilitary wing of Hamas fall into the ICTY 
definitions.  In evaluating Israel’s armed conflict legal 
justifications, remarkably neither a single leading human rights 
NGO nor the Turkish Report took notice of the potency of Hamas’ 
paramilitary forces.  Currently, these forces include more than 
15,000 operatives,91 and are organized into semi-military 
formations throughout the Gaza Strip.92  They are deployed in 
territorial brigades and designated units.  Each territorial brigade 
has more than one thousand operatives divided into battalions.  
Hamas’ weapons capabilities additionally include foreign 
manufactured artillery rockets, anti-tank weapons, foreign 
manufactured mines, anti-aircraft weapons, and night vision 
equipment.93 
Thirdly, the intensity threshold necessitates that a non-
international armed conflict starts with the instigation of hostilities 
and ends only when a peace agreement is mutually agreed upon.94  
 
90 Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 154 (1997), available at 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/97eng/Argentina11137.htm; see also 
Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, para. 89 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005), available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/limaj/tjug/en/lim-tj051130-e.pdf (distinguishing 
an armed conflict from banditry, insurrections, and terrorist activities, which are 
not subject to international humanitarian law).  Noticeably, the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court in article 8(2)(d) further supports this rule.  See 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(d), July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) (excluding from the definition of war 
crimes those crimes that are committed during “situations of internal disturbances 
and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a 
similar nature”). 
91 Marie Colvin, Hamas Wages Iran’s Proxy War on Israel, LONDON SUNDAY 
TIMES, Mar. 9 2008. 
92 See id. (discussing the extent to which Iran is believed to be behind Hamas 
military operations, including their use of sophisticated weaponry). 
93 See The Operation in Gaza, supra note 89, para. 80 (listing the significant 
weapon and supply stockpiles amassed by Hamas after being smuggled through 
Egypt into Gaza). 
94 See Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, para. 128 
(Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone Aug. 2, 2007), available at http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=ENLjRKVm%2fDg%3d&tabid=104 (noting that a 
state of armed conflict may continue after hostilities have ceased in an area); 
Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, para. 183 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998) (citing the Tadic case and noting that 
international humanitarian law applies until the general conclusion of peace is 
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This is the case even in the backdrop of interim periods of little or 
no intensity.95  In the Fofana (CDF) case, the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone held that an armed conflict started in March 1991 and ended 
in January 2002. 96  The same Special Court in the Brima (AFRC) 
case, however, held that during 1992 to 1993, there was an interim 
period where no hostilities occurred between the Sierra Leonean 
Army (SLA) and the Revolutionary Union Front (RUF).97 
Similarly, with the present case of Hamas, no cease-fires ever 
led to a peace agreement or even the cessation of hostilities; 
Hamas’s violation of cease-fire agreement became its modus 
operandi.  For example, since the beginning of the cease-fire of 
November 25, 2006, more than forty Kassam rockets have been 
 
achieved in an international armed conflict or until a peace settlement is reached 
in the case of internal armed conflict); Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Decision on Motion 
for Judgment of Acquittal, Case No. IT-02-54-T, para. 17 (citing Tadic for the 
criteria for determining whether a non-international armed conflict exists: the 
level organization of the parties and the intensity of the fighting); Prosecutor v. 
Halilovic, Case No, IT-01-48-T, Judgment, paras. 24, 26, & footnote 72 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2005) (same); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case 
No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment, paras. 101–02 (Dec. 6, 1999), available at 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CRutaganda%5Cjudgeme
nt%5C991206.pdf (citing Akayesu for the same test of armed conflict); see also, 
Prosecutor v. Kallon, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to 
Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty, para. 18 (Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone Mar. 13, 
2004), available at http://www.transcrim.org/07%20SCSL%20-%202004%20-
%20Kallon%20Kamara (holding that the Lomé Agreement ended the armed 
conflict). 
95 See Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, paras. 124–28 (focusing the 
analysis on the level of organization of the parties rather than on the intensity of 
the conflict); Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, para. 183 (quoting Tadic for 
the holding that IHL applies to the entire territory under control of the warring 
parties, whether conflict occurs in particular areas); Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, 
Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal para. 16–22 (focusing on a party’s 
control over territory, rather than on the intensity of the conflict); Halilovic, Case 
No, IT-01-48-T,  Judgment, para. 26 (citing Tadic for the proposition that IHL 
applies over the whole territory of an armed conflict whether conflict occurs 
there). 
96 See Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeal Judgment, para 
17 (Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone, May 28, 2008), available at http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=9xsCbIVrMlY%3d&tabid=194 (discussing the 
Trial Chamber judgment). 
97 See Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Prosecution’s Pre-Trial 
Brief Pursuant to Order for Filing Pre-Trial Briefs, para. 9 (Spec. Ct. for Sierra 
Leone, Mar. 5, 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl/Public/SCSL-04-16-
PT-AFRC/SCSL-04-16-PT-029/SCSL-04-16-PT-029-I.pdf (finding that, instead of 
fighting each other, the Sierra Leonean Army and the Revolutionary Union Front 
had been looting and abusing citizens together). 
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fired into Israel.98  Moreover, since the de facto cease-fire of 
Operation Cast Lead, 337 rockets and 335 mortar shells have been 
fired into Israel from the Gaza Strip by Hamas, with neither a 
peace agreement nor a stable cease-fire between the parties in 
sight.99 
The criteria for intensity towards the Israeli-Hamas hostilities, 
post-disengagement, ultimately were reviewed by the Israeli 
Supreme Court in a meticulous 2006 judgment of a challenge to the 
Israeli military’s “targeted killings.”100  The Court held that 
between Israel and the various terrorist organizations, including 
Hamas in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, there had been strikes 
that “cause[d] harm and even death to innocent civilians.”101  That 
is, there had been attacks and responses direct and constant 
enough to constitute an armed conflict since the first Palestinian 
uprising (the First Intifada).102  In continuation, the law applied by 
the Court was that of international armed conflicts.103  This analysis 
is widespread within legal academia,104 and was later reaffirmed 
 
98 Behind the Headlines: Kassam Fire Goes on Despite Cease-fire, ISRAEL MINISTRY 
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Dec. 21, 2006), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA 
/About+the+Ministry/Behind+the+Headlines/Behind+the+headlines+-
+Kassam+fire+goes+on+despite+cease-fire+21-Dec-2006.htm. 
99 See Palestinian Ceasefire Violations since the End of Operation Cast Lead, Israel 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA 
/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Hamas+war+against+Israel/Palestinian 
_ceasefire_violations_since_end_Operation_Cast_Lead.htm (chronicling rockets 
and mortar shells fired into Israeli territory). 
100 See generally Targeted Killing case, supra note 48. 
101 Id. para. 61. 
102 The First Intifada (1987–1993) is known as the Palestinian uprising against 
the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories.  See generally INTIFADA: THE 
PALESTINIAN UPRISING AGAINST ISRAELI OCCUPATION 5 (Zachary Lockman & Joel 
Beinin eds., 1989). 
103 See Targeted Killing case, supra note 48, paras. 11, 16 (“[A] continuous 
situation of armed conflict has existed since the first infitada.”). 
104 See, e.g., Yaël Ronen, ICC Jurisdiction Over Acts Committed in the Gaza Strip, 
8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 3, 4 (2010) (chronicling numerous attacks killing many 
Palestinians and some Israelis, and resultant claims of violations of laws of armed 
conflict from both sides); Randle C. DeFalco, The Right to Food in Gaza: Israel’s 
Obligation Under International Law, 35 RUTGERS L. REC. 11, 17–22 (2009) (discussing 
mandates and standards during times of international armed conflict); George E. 
Bisharat, Israel’s Invasion of Gaza in International Law, 38 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 
41, 52–56 (2009) (discussing Israel’s desire to change the legal basis for its military 
operations “from a law enforcement model to one of ‘armed conflict’”); Orna Ben-
Naftali & Keren R. Michaeli, ‘We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law’: A Legal 
Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 233, 271 (2003) 
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by the Israeli Chief Military Advocate General in the backdrop of 
the May 31, 2010 Freedom Flotilla to Gaza events.105 
To conclude, in contrast to the stance adopted both by 
Turkey106 and the UNHRC Fact Finding Report,107 the Supreme 
Court of Israel and later the Turkel Commission Report initiated by 
Israel were correct in adopting the position that (international) 
humanitarian law applies to an armed conflict between Israel and 
Hamas not merely in an area that is subject to occupation, but in 
any case of an armed conflict of an international character.108  
Certainly, The Israeli Supreme Court has implemented this 
approach consistently in several judgments that addressed the 
state of hostilities between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip.109 
Although Israel’s effective control over the borders of Gaza 
appears well established, with both Israel and Egypt controlling 
Gazan crossings respectively, the argument that Israel maintains 
effective control throughout Gaza as a result of control of the 
border is considerably weak.  Israel’s control over Gaza is 
 
(stating that the existence of an armed conflict is determined by the intensity of 
hostilities). 
105 See Testimony of The Chief Military Advocate General Avichai 
Mandelblit, The Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 
2010, The Turkel Commission, Session Number Four, 10 (Aug. 28, 2010) (detailing 
the sources of legal advice given to the Israeli Navy). 
106 See TURKISH NAT’L COMM’N OF INQUIRY, supra note 12 (describing an Israeli 
attack on a humanitarian aid convoy to Gaza as using “excessive, indiscriminate 
and disproportionate force . . . against the civilians on board”); Security Council 
Speech, supra note 12 (expressing the Turkish position that the Israeli blockade of 
Gaza was illegal collective punishment). 
107 See Human Rights Council Report, supra note 17, at 15 (restating the 
conclusion of Human Rights Council Reports deeming the Israeli blockade of 
Gaza unlawful). 
108 See Targeted Killing case, supra note 48, para. 18 (stating that the question 
remains whether the armed conflict is of an international or non-international 
nature, notwithstanding the absence of international humanitarian law 
throughout the Turkish led position). 
109 See, e.g., HCJ 201/09 Physicians for Human Rights v. Prime Minister 1 
IsrLR 1, 11–13 [2009], available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/09 
/010/002/n07/09002010.n07.pdf (addressing the question of whether the conflict 
between Israel and Hamas is an international armed conflict); Yuval Shany, The 
Law Applicable to Non-occupied Gaza: A Comment on Bassiouni v. Prime Minister of 
Israel, 42 ISR. L. REV. 101, 110 (2009) (arguing that the Court’s decision can be seen 
as the outcome of balancing the human rights of residents of Gaza and Israel’s 
national security); The Operation in Gaza, supra note 89 (discussing various issues 
under international law arising out of Israel’s treatment of Gaza, and concluding 
that Israel’s use of force was necessary and proportionate). 
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especially weak because Hamas exerts considerable local, civil, and 
military control over and within the entire Gaza Strip.  
Furthermore, neither Gaza nor the Palestinian Authority has been 
recognized as a sovereign state.110  It is therefore uncertain whether 
they enjoy independence or sovereignty at large.  As such, it is 
theoretically possible that the conflict between Israel and Hamas is 
instead a non-international armed conflict.  In such a case, the only 
international humanitarian law protections applicable are those 
laid out in the second Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions (Protocol II), notwithstanding Israel’s reluctance to 
ratify it. 
2.4. The Laws of Armed Conflicts at Sea 
The third critique to the classification of the Gaza Strip as 
occupied territory by the Turkish and UNHRC Reports absent an 
armed conflict considers the law of armed conflicts at sea.  It bears 
witness to two central observations that refer to national liberation 
organizations or other paramilitary non-state actors.111 
First, state practice shows that national liberation movements’ 
units or other non-state actors often conduct belligerent operations 
at sea.  Two examples of this are the Polisario Front attacking 
Spanish trawlers fishing in the territorial waters off the Western 
Sahara coast,112 and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 
 
110 See, e.g., Daniel Benoliel & Ronen Perry, Israel, Palestine and the ICC, 32 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 73, 101–08 (2010) (discussing possible arguments for the 
establishment of a recognition of Gaza or Palestine as a sovereign state, but 
explaining why the establishment of such states is inconsistent with a great deal of 
international law); Ronen, supra note 104, at 19 (explaining various interpretations 
of methods of establishing sovereignty, and stating that the limited jurisdiction 
Palestinians have over the Gaza Strip has a “limited” effect on third parties). 
111 Traditional rights connected with war at sea within international armed 
conflicts referred to herein can be classified as hostilities between the constituted 
government and the national liberation movement.  That is, in opposition to 
hostilities waged by the constituted government or the national liberation 
movement against ships belonging to third States on the other, such as Turkey in 
our case.  The latter rather more legally constrained criteria remain outside the 
scope of this Article, as explained at the outset.  For more, see generally Natalino 
Ronzitti, Introductory: The Crisis of the Traditional Law Regulating International Armed 
Conflicts at Sea and the Need for its Revision, in THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: A 
COLLECTION OF AGREEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS WITH COMMENTARIES 11–12 (N. 
Ronzitti ed., 1988). 
112 See id. at 11 (citing the Polisario Front as an example of a national 
liberation movement being able to use the sea for “belligerent operations”). 
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small naval units using small boats to approach Israeli beaches.113  
The Israeli Turkel Committee was correct in offering an analogy 
between the armed conflict at sea in the territorial waters of the 
Gaza Strip and the Lebanese conflict in 2006, whereby the 
“blockading Israeli warship INS Hanit was hit by a missile 
launched by Hezbollah from the Lebanese coast.”114  The Israeli 
Turkel Committee was also likely to be correct in affirming that in 
light of the fact that the naval fleet of Hamas contains “mainly 
small vessels that are capable of moving at high speeds, Israel’s 
naval forces were confronted with a significant risk.”115  This risk is 
demonstrated by the attacks on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000 in Yemen, 
and the attack on the French supertanker Limburg in 2002.116 
The Israeli Military Advocate-General, in his testimony before 
the Turkel Commission, fittingly has confirmed that Israel is bound 
by international humanitarian law regardless of the classification 
of the conflict as on land or at sea. 
Secondly, the law of armed conflicts at sea serves as a critique 
to the Turkish and the UNHRC Report’s classification on 
additional grounds.  The law of armed conflicts at sea noticeably 
sustains lawful naval blockades in non-international armed 
conflicts, such as the Israeli-Hamas blockade.  Similar to the case of 
the Israeli naval blockade over Hamas, states elsewhere have 
imposed a military or economic blockade against an enemy that 
was not considered a de jure government.117  Again, this practice 
stretches worldwide, from the recognized naval blockade placed 
by Union states on the Confederate states during the American 
Civil War between the years 1861 and 1865, to the Bangladesh 
 
113 See id. (explaining that Israel has destroyed boats carrying Palestinian 
guerrillas and arrested ships suspected to have PLO members on board). 
114 The Israeli Turkel Committee, supra note 13, at 53. 
115 Id. 
116 See id. (using the U.S.S. Cole and the Limburg as examples of “the threat 
presented by small vessels and the difficulty in stopping them”).  The 
applicability of these international armed conflicts examples to non-international 
armed conflict remains outside the scope of this Article, which, as said, leaves 
unresolved the question of whether the Israeli-Hamas armed conflict is 
international or non-international in nature. 
117 See e.g., C. JOHN COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 714–30 
(6th ed. 1967) (chronicling the history of blockades and the related international 
laws). 
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Liberation War in 1971.118  The Turkish-led position regrettably 
never considered state practices in its quest to make the case for the 
alternative. 
On that account, the Turkish position is even more  
questionable because of Turkey’s statement that the San Remo 
Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea 
relates specifically to legal practice in time of war, which 
supposedly was not the case during the Israeli naval blockade over 
Gaza.119  The San Remo Manual evidently does apply to the 
blockade, however.  The official Explanation that accompanies the 
Manual states that even though its provisions were intended to 
apply for the most part in situations of international armed 
conflicts at sea, this fact was not stated expressly in order not to 
deter the application of the manual’s provisions to non-
international armed conflicts, insofar as they involve naval 
warfare.120  In other words, in contrast to the Turkish-led position, 
the San Remo Manual could apply to both types of armed conflict.  
Lastly, the imposition of the naval blockade on the Gaza Strip is 
not unprecedented in the law of non-international armed conflict.  
The naval blockade imposed by Israel on the Hezbollah 
organization in Lebanon in March 2006 has been internationally 
recognized as such, and is effective erga omnes.121 
The third critique of the Turkish and UNHRC Report’s 
classification of the Gaza Strip as occupied territory absent an 
armed conflict argues that reservation towards the former view is 
 
118 Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Naval Blockade, 75 INT’L L. STUD. 203, 211 
(2000) (describing several blockades throughout history, including the Indian 
Navy’s blockade of the entire coast of Bangladesh). 
119 See TURKISH NAT’L COMM’N OF INQUIRY, supra note 12, at 60–62 (arguing 
that the San Remo Manual is applicable to international armed conflicts at sea, but 
not those of a non-international character). 
120 San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at 
Sea: Explanation, INT’L INST. HUMANIT. LAW 73 (1995).  As most of the rules that 
appear in the San Remo Manual reflect customary international law, they are 
binding on Israel.  See Testimony of The Chief Military Advocate General, Avichai 
Mandelblit, supra note 105, at 56 (“Most of the rules that appear in the San Remo 
Manual, in my opinion, by my understanding they reflect customary international 
law and therefore bind us.”). 
121 See NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE 
ACTORS 250–54 (2010) (discussing the legal issues behind the Isreali-Hezbollah 
conflicts in 2006); ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, GEORGE SULLIVAN & WILLIAM D. 
SULLIVAN, LESSONS OF THE 2006 ISRAELI-HEZBOLLAH WAR 131–35 (2007) (discussing 
Israel’s use of naval forces against Hezbollah). 
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further endorsed per territorial waters controlled by that state 
(Israel in our case).122 
To conclude this section, Turkey and the UNHRC Report have 
almost flatly ignored the question of whether the situation in the 
Gaza Strip is not only a situation of occupation, but also one of 
active hostilities or armed conflict, either international or non-
international.  This stance is especially weak on questions of 
international humanitarian law (IHL).  It is exceedingly important 
to distinguish what each in point of fact thought on these 
questions.123  Turkey and the UNHRC failed to explain why a 
situation of armed conflict is absent even if the Gaza Strip post-
2005 is still considered occupied territory.  Both neglected to 
inquire whether the hostilities reached the level and intensity 
required for the situation to be regarded as an armed conflict.  If 
this level was reached, Turkey and the UNHRC have failed to 
provide evidence on which to base such an assessment.  Moreover, 
Turkey and the UNHRC seemingly failed to argue that even if 
hostilities that reach the degree and level required to be regarded 
as an armed conflict take place in occupied territories, the 
occupying power remains restricted by the law of belligerent 
occupation and may not resort to that part of the jus in bello that 
applies to active hostilities. 
3. THE COLLAPSE INTO BELLIGERENT  
OCCUPATION DIALECTICS 
But is the Turkish-led position concerning belligerent 
occupation (absent armed conflict) in Gaza legally sustainable?  
There seem to be two groups of arguments raised by critiques of 
that question.  The first applies substantive belligerent occupation 
law to the situation in Gaza.  This post-disengagement occupation 
law dialectic is highly controversial.  The second group of 
 
122 Cf. Ronzitti, The Crisis of the Traditional Law Regulating International Armed 
Conflicts at Sea and the Need for its Revision, in THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra 
note 111, at 13–14 (discussing the impact that classifying waters as territorial or 
neutral has on naval warfare).  To be sure, IHL does not provide for national 
liberation movements to enjoy belligerent rights on the high seas.  Id. 
123 See, e.g., David Kretzmer, The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of 
International Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 88, 88–89 (2005) (“Rigorous 
examination of the specific facts would seem to be indispensable in any inquiry 
into compliance with norms of [of IHL], especially when carried out by a judicial 
body.”). 
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arguments flow from the Gaza Flotilla crisis of May 31, 2011.  It 
derives from belligerent occupation law’s numerous, particular 
implications of the naval blockade, possibly making a stronger case 
for the occupation of Gaza even since the 2005 disengagement. 
3.1. Primary considerations 
The first line of argumentation contends that belligerent 
occupation law governs the situation in Gaza post-disengagement.  
Yet this view, after the 2005 Israeli disengagement from the Gaza 
Strip, is highly debatable.124 
The present legal uncertainty over the matter is threefold.  To 
begin with, it is unclear to which degree effective control may or 
may not necessarily entail actual military presence on the 
ground.125  While “the source of the occupying power’s authority is 
military superiority,” the ability to exercise authority rather than 
actual physical presence supposedly determines when a territory is 
occupied.126  While the Turkel Commission Report notably rejected 
this argument,127 many disagree with the Commission, arguing 
 
124 Compare Shany, supra note 109, at 104–07 (agreeing with the conclusion of 
the Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, that Gaza is not an 
occupied territory), with David Luban, Was the Gaza Campaign Legal?, 31 A.B.A. 
NAT’L SEC. L. REP. 2, 2–3 (2009) (noting that, despite its traditional backing of 
Israel, the United States and the U.N. view Gaza as occupied territory).  For the 
view that Gaza is still subjected to Israeli belligerent occupation, see, e.g., Human 
Rights Council Report, supra note 17, ¶¶ 270–78; see also Sari Bashi & Kenneth 
Mann, Disengaged Occupiers: The Legal Status of Gaza, GISHA: LEGAL CENTER FOR 
FREEDOM, 75–89 (2007) (providing a thorough analysis of the effective control test 
for occupation, but ultimately concluding that Israel occupies Gaza); Mustafa 
Mari, The Israeli Disengagement from the Gaza Strip: An End of the Occupation?, 8 Y.B. 
INT’L HUM. L. 356, 366–68 (2005) (outlining Israel’s disengagement fro the Gaza 
strip and concluding that the events in the area “leave no room for questioning 
the status of Israel in the Gaza Strip: it remains the Occupying Power”).  
125 See Shany, supra note 109, at 104 (noting that in the List case the 
Nuremburg Tribunal held that Germany “occupied” territories that were outside 
its actual control); Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Israel’s Legal Obligations to Gaza after 
the Pullout, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 524, 525 (2006) (“Boots on the ground are often a 
reasonable proxy for authority over a territory, but nothing in the Hague 
Convention makes them a prerequisite for a finding of occupation.”). 
126 Bashi & Mann, supra note 124, at 76 (positing that it is not physical 
presence but the ability to exert control that determines whether one government 
actor occupies the territory of another). 
127  The Israeli Turkel Committee, supra note 12, ¶ 47, at 53  (“[I]n alignment 
with the Supreme Court of Israel, the Commission takes the position that Israel’s 
effective control of the Gaza Strip ended when the disengagement was completed 
in 2005.”).  
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that Israel’s control over several particular areas aggregately affect 
the fabric of life in the Gaza Strip and amount to ‘effective control’ 
of the Gaza Strip.  The non-government organization Gisha:  Legal 
Center for Freedom of Movement, for example, argued before the 
Turkel Commission that Israel effectively continues to control the 
Gaza Strip for six reasons:   
(i) Israel controls movement to and from the Gaza Strip via  
land crossings; (ii) Israel exercises complete control over Gaza’s  
airspace and territorial waters; (iii) Israel controls movement  
within Gaza through periodic incursions and a ‘no-go zone’;  
(iv) Israel controls the Palestinian population registry; (v) Israel  
exercises control over Gaza’s tax system and fiscal policy; (vi)  
Israel exercises control over the Palestinian Authority and its  
ability to provide services to Gaza residents.128   
This consideration, however, has not reached consensus legally or 
within world public opinion. 
Professor Yuval Shany, for example, points out a second 
challenge to the occupation narration of Gaza since the 2005 
disengagement—namely, that the existence of an organized, albeit 
de facto, Palestinian government that exercises effective 
governmental powers in the Strip without significant external 
intervention is further evidence that belligerent occupation of Gaza 
has ended.129  In startling contrast to the Israeli Supreme Court’s 
decision in Al-Bassiouni v. Prime Minister—with which the Turkel 
Commission agreed—human right organizations,130 the Turkish 
 
128 Id. ¶ 45, at 51. 
129 Shany, supra note 109, at 105 (explaining the reasons why Palestinian 
presence in the Gaza Strip negates contentions that the Gaza Strip is occupied by 
Israel); Shany, Binary Law, supra note 27, at 77 (suggesting that the situation in 
Gaza is a borderline case because while Israel exerts some control over the Gaza 
Strip, it “falls short of the level of control typically associated with occupiers 
under the classic occupation paradigm,” since some degree of control is also 
exercised by the Palestinian government). 
130 See THE ISRAELI TURKEL COMM., supra note 13, at 51 n.154 (testimony of Ms. 
Jessica Montel, member of the B’Tselem organization). 
There is no doubt that Israel does not currently have effective control in 
all aspects of life in the Gaza Strip, but it has such control in a few very 
central areas, in the air space, the maritime space, the population 
registry, the entry and exit of people and of cargo. 
Id. 
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government, the UNHRC Report,131 and the Goldstone Report132 all 
centered their legal analyses on the applicability of belligerent 
occupation law in Gaza since the disengagement, while 
systematically ignoring Professor Shany’s proposition.  
Regrettably, the Turkish-led position gave little or no analytical 
attention to the objection to occupation dialectic, nor did the 
Turkish-led position consider the applicability of armed conflicts 
law particular to belligerent occupation law.133 
There is a third legal uncertainty as to whether belligerent 
occupation law should apply to Israel’s presumably effective 
control in Gaza post-disengagement—the inaccurate legal trail in 
the UNHRC’s Fact Finding Report.  The Report seemingly refers in 
its underlying paradigm to three factually unsettling United 
Nations resolutions:  Security Council Resolution 1860 (2009) and 
General Assembly Resolutions 64/92 and 64/94.134  For a start, the 
UNHRC Fact Finding Report refers to the Security Council 
Resolution in relation to its position concerning the post-
disengagement Israeli occupation of Gaza.  The wording of the 
Resolution, instead, merely stresses that the Gaza Strip was an 
important part of the territory occupied in 1967 which is to become 
part of a future Palestinian state.  In other words, the drafters of the 
Security Council Resolution carefully avoided what the UNHRC 
Report does not, which is to consider Gaza as an occupied 
 
131 See Human Rights Council Report, supra note 17, ¶¶ 62–64, at 15 
(discussing whether Israel’s control of Gaza rises to the level of occupation under 
international humanitarian law and deciding it does). 
132 See The Goldstone Report, supra note 17, ¶¶ 270–85 (devoting eleven 
paragraphs in a section on international humanitarian law to the question of 
whether the law of occupation applies to Israel’s control over the Gaza Strip, 
while devoting only three paragraphs to whether the law of armed conflict 
applies to conflict of an arguably non-international nature). 
133 See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 20, at 272 (stating that occupation continues 
until a durable shift of control from the Occupying Power to the Sovereign people 
takes place).  
134 See Human Rights Council Report, supra note 17, at 15 n.52 (citing the 
Security Council Resolution 1860 (2009), and General Assembly Resolutions 64/92 
and 64/94, as repeated confirmation that Israel currently occupied the Gaza Strip).  
For further background see G.A. Res. 64/92, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/92 (Jan. 
19, 2010) (describing Israel as the “occupying power” in a Palestinian Territory); 
G.A. Res. 64/94, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/94 (Jan. 19, 2010) (noting Israel’s 
human rights violations in the “Occupied Palestinian Territory”); S.C. Res. 1860, ¶ 
1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1860 (Jan. 8, 2009) (calling for the withdrawal of Israeli troops 
from Gaza). 
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territory.  With Security Council Resolution 1860 being the sole 
post-2005 disengagement resolution, it halfheartedly serves as 
reference to the choice of law found within the UNHRC Report. 
In addition, the UNHRC Report refers to General Assembly 
Resolutions 64/92 and 64/94, which both avoid relating or 
mentioning Gaza’s legal status post-2005 disengagement, but 
rather broadly refer to a occupied Palestinian Territory, which 
includes East Jerusalem.  In sum, the United Nations resolutions 
again serve a rather questionable reference to the classification by 
Turkey and the UNHRC Report. 
3.2. Supporting Considerations 
The second group of arguments in support of belligerent 
occupation status for Gaza since the disengagement grows out of 
the Gaza Flotilla crisis of May 31, 2011.  It derives belligerent 
occupation implications from the naval blockade and its 
enforcement in international waters.  Five such arguments deserve 
special attention, given their rather abbreviated yet oratory appeal 
within the Turkish-led position on belligerent occupation and 
Gaza.  First, sanctions of the kind approved by the Israeli cabinet 
being collective punishment are said to support the conclusion that 
Gaza is belligerently occupied by Israel.  Second, Israel’s 
imposition of a naval blockade per se supports the conclusion that 
Israel is belligerently occupying Gaza.  Third, Israel’s control of the 
airspace over the Gaza Strip implicates its degree of effective 
control, supporting the conclusion that Israel is a belligerent 
occupier.  Fourth, the alleged violation of human rights by Israel in 
Gaza further supports the argument that Israel is a belligerent 
occupier.  Finally, humanitarian law obligations on Israel could be 
perceived as post bellum obligations throughout a transition period 
during which authority is transferred to a legitimate sovereign in 
Gaza. 
This second group of supportive arguments raises numerous 
reservations.  Firstly, the Turkish argument,135 in conjunction with 
 
135 See Turkish National Commission of Inquiry, supra note 12, at 78–81 
(arguing that the blockade, disguised as a security measure against Hamas, but 
which really was a punitive measure against Gaza, is illegal under international 
humanitarian law). 
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the United Nations136 and humanitarian organizations,137 
suggested that sanctions of the kind approved by the Israeli 
cabinet—including the naval blockade of Gaza—constitute a form 
of prohibited collective punishment within belligerent occupation 
law.138  Hence these measures, broadly coined by Turkey as 
‘sanctions,’ logically put in force the initial Turkish argument of 
belligerent occupation of Gaza.  Sanctions during occupation, 
according to the Turkish line of reasoning, negate some of the 
occupying power’s other obligations toward the protected 
population, such as the duty to maintain public services or the 
duty under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) to provide an adequate standard of 
living.139 
 
136 See Louis Charbonneau, Collective Punishment for Gaza is Wrong -U.N., 
REUTERS, Jan. 18, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2008 
/01/18/idUSN18343083 (quoting the United Nations’ most senior humanitarian 
official, Sir John Holmes, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and 
Emergency Relief Coordinator:  “[w]e all understand the security problems and 
the need to respond to that but collective punishment of the people of Gaza is not, 
we believe, the appropriate way to do that”).   
137 See, e.g., Israel Cuts Electricity and Food Supplies to Gaza, AMNESTY INT’L (Jan. 
21, 2008), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/israel-cuts-
electricity-and-food-supplies-gaza-20080121 (calling for an immediate lifting of 
the blockade in order to avert a public health emergency and deaths of the most 
vulnerable—the sick, the elderly, women, and children). 
138 See Geoffrey Aronson, Issues Arising from the Implementation of Israel’s 
Disengagement from the Gaza Strip, 34 J. PALESTINE STUD. 49, 57 (2005) (highlighting 
some of the rights and responsibilities Israel has as an occupying power through a 
study of the Gaza Strip after disengagement and a recognized end the 
occupation).  Although the Turkish Report did not reference any specific 
provisions of international humanitarian law, see Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 33, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 973 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention] (“Collective penalties and 
likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.”).  
139 See, e.g., Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 138, art. 56 (articulating 
the duty to maintain “medical and hospital establishments and services, public 
health and hygiene in the occupied territory”); id. art. 59 (articulating the duty of a 
Occupying Power to facilitate relief schemes to ensure the provision of food, 
medical supplies, and clothing); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 69, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 17512 (articulating 
an Occupying Power’s duty to ensure provision of clothing, bedding, shelter and 
objects necessary for religious worship); International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, art. 11–12, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 14531 
(articulating the duty to ensure the realization of the right to adequate standard of 
living and of the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health); Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
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Yet this position is incomplete and also lacks the explanatory 
power to explain the gap between the overall Turkish and Israeli 
propositions in a broader sense.  In response to the Turkish 
position, therefore, even in the backdrop of the highly contentious 
humanitarian implications of the Israeli sanctions, legally framing 
the lex generalis alongside the lex specialis bodies of law still renders 
much relevancy.  In essence, the imposition of an Israeli policy that 
resembles unilateral sanctions does not render per se the Gaza Strip 
an occupied area.  Israeli sanctions cannot be construed to establish 
“effective control” within belligerent occupation law, as opposed 
to the alternative missing categorization of these sanctions by 
Turkey within the law of armed conflicts.  Thus, sanctions could 
have been said instead to have exercised Israel’s control over its 
border with Gaza whereby goods and persons can still enter the 
Strip from sovereign Egypt.140  
 Egypt indeed has pledged on numerous occasions to Israel not 
to open the Gaza-Egyptian border controls until the European 
border monitors return—something that would require Israeli 
consent.141  Israel’s consent or lack thereof does not constitute per se 
effective control under belligerent occupation jurisprudence, but 
nevertheless is a rather serious concern for the law of armed 
conflicts to assess.  In particular, the Turkish Report has missed the 
opportunity to pursue that analytical path altogether. 
Moreover, Israel’s humanitarian policy towards Gaza most 
likely cannot be understood as the imposition of bilateral sanctions 
nor can it be justified under belligerent occupation law.  This is the 
case even in the backdrop of worldwide resentment over both the 
 
Land, art. 43, Oct. 18, 1907, 1 Bevans 631 (1968) (articulating an occupant’s duty to 
restore and ensure public order and safety while respecting the laws in force in 
the country).  
140 See Barak Ravid, Israel Agrees to Let UN Chief, EU Commissioner Enter Gaza, 
HAARETZ (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.haaretz.com/news/israel-agrees-to-let-un-
chief-eu-commissioner-enter-gaza-1.264345 (informing that, in order to ease 
international pressure in response to the blockade, Israel granted a unique request 
from U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and EU Foreign Policy Commissioner 
Lady Catherine Ashton to enter Gaza in order to closely inspect humanitarian aid 
work.  It was the first time Israel acceded to a request from international officials 
since December 2008). 
141 See Egypt Will Keep Gaza Strip Border Closed: Israel, CTV NEWS, June 24, 
2008, http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/SciTech/20080624/Egypt_olmert_080624/ 
(reporting that Egypt had pledged “not to reopen its border crossing with the 
Hamas-run Gaza Strip until a captive Israeli soldier was set free”). 
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legal status of Gaza and the humanitarian implications of the 
sanctions themselves.  Bilateral sanctions require the involvement 
of two sovereign states, which, in the case of the Hamas-led Gaza 
Strip, is absent.142 
If Gaza is neither occupied nor is a state, then a separate legal 
framework governing economic sanctions between warring parties 
within the law of armed conflicts applies.143  Turkey regrettably has 
failed in following this setting.  It should have found the law of 
armed conflicts better suited in considering Israeli sanctions over 
Gaza potentially illegal, at least in part.  To illustrate, Article 33 to 
the Fourth Geneva Convention, in particular, prohibits collective 
 
142 For examples of states closing borders in the framework of bilateral 
sanctions, consider the economic blockade of Armenia by Turkey and Azerbaijan, 
as well as the economic blockade of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
by Greece.  See generally Artak Dabaghyan & Mkhitar Gabrielyan, Keeping Border 
Market Afloat: On Drivers and Constraints of Cross Border Cooperation in the South 
Caucasus, CAUCUS RES. RESOURCE CENTERS, http://www.crrc.am/store/files 
/Article_on_border_market.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2011) (discussing the 
economic and cultural impact of border closings); Azerbaijani MP Offers Iran to 
Close Borders with Armenia, NEWS.AZ (Feb. 12, 2010), http://news.az/articles/8967 
(reporting on the suggestion by deputy Zahid Oruj that Iran close its Armenian 
border in order to facilitate settlement of the Karabakh conflict).  See also Deputy 
Foreign Minister:  Closed Borders in 21st Century Are Unnatural, PANORAMA.AM (Mar. 
30, 2009), http://www.panorama.am/en/politics/2009/03/30/agn/?sw 
(reporting statements made by the Deputy Foreign Minister of Armenia Karine 
Ghazinyan that states should retain open borders while attempting to resolve 
conflict); Macedonia Embargo is Halted by Greece, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 16, 1995, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/16/world/macedonia-embargo-is-halted-
by-greece.html (describing Greece’s nineteen month embargo of the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as “crippling” and harmful to both the Greek 
and Macedonian economies). 
143 But see Amichai Cohen, Economic Sanctions in IHL: Suggested Principles, 42 
ISR L. REV. 117, 117 (2009) (accepting that while international humanitarian law 
applies to armed conflicts, other conditions regarding economic sanctions should 
be adopted so as to limit their harmful effects on civilians).  For the theory of 
sanctions in international law, see Eiichi Fukatsu, Coercion and the Theory of 
Sanctions in International Law, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE AND THEORY 1187, 1188 (Ronald St.J. 
Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983) (contending that international law 
is enforced by the reaction and interaction of states in the form of sanctions); see 
also Todd A. Wynkoop, The Use of Force Against Third Party Neutrals to Enforce 
Economic Sanctions Against a Belligerent, 42 NAVAL L. REV. 91, 98 (1995) (suggesting 
a framework analogous to Justice Jackson’s Youngstown v. Sawyer framework for 
analyzing the scope of executive power depending on the behavior of Congress 
for analyzing the legality of a state’s resort to sanctions depending on Security 
Council behavior). 
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punishment of protected persons.144  “Protected persons” are 
civilian individuals who, in a situation of an occupation or armed 
conflict, find themselves in the hands of a power of which they are 
not nationals, such as in the case of Israel.145  More specifically, the 
term “protected persons” has also been applied to refugees and 
stateless persons in cases of armed conflict without belligerent 
occupation, as possibly is the case of Palestinian Gazans.146 
To conclude, Turkey has erred, and regrettably so, in 
laconically depicting Israel as an occupying power thereby 
criticizing Israel for collectively punishing its “protected persons.”  
Fair legal variance over the question of Gaza as belligerently 
occupied leaves the logic of collective punishment mistakenly 
dependent on the occupation hypothesis.  Turkey should have 
proposed a second accumulative or independent analytical 
approach:  if no belligerent occupation of Gaza exists, Turkey 
should have analyzed Israel’s activity in Gaza under the law of 
armed conflicts.  It would have been able to cautiously assess 
Israel’s de facto siege warfare policies over Gaza possibly in 
aggregation of its various ramifications at land, air and lately also 
at sea. 
Secondly, Turkey additionally argued that Israel’s imposition 
of a naval blockade, independently of its legality per se, further 
supports the legal narrative under which Israel is belligerently 
occupying Gaza.147  The Turkel Commission rightly replied to the 
latter argument that, similar to the air space blockade argument, 
the imposition of a naval blockade does not put into effect 
belligerent occupation law.148  Notwithstanding the broader 
debatable question of effective control over Gaza, such control 
would have meant also the power to maintain law and order over 
the shores of Gaza independently.149  Israeli forces in such 
 
144 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 138. 
145 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1145 (Peter MacAlister-
Smith ed., 1992). 
146 Id. at 1146. 
147 TURKISH NAT’L COMM’N OF INQUIRY, supra note 12, at 78 (making the point 
that the blockade was in fact retaliation for the election of Hamas). 
148 ISRAELI TURKEL COMM., supra note 13, ¶ 46, at 52.  
149 Id. (“It should be emphasized that the very lack of ‘control’ over the land 
territory in the Gaza Strip in the traditional sense of this term is what makes an 
external naval blockade necessary to control access to and egress from that 
territory.”) 
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hypothetical reality would be able to intercept vessels from the 
coast of the Gaza Strip.  In practice, however, Israel post-
disengagement never kept control over the coast of the Gaza 
Strip.150  The Hamas security apparatus, including naval forces, 
effectively controls this area.151 
Thirdly, Turkey claims that Israel’s control of the airspace of 
the Gaza Strip is evidence that Israel is belligerently occupying 
Gaza even since the disengagement.152  In response, as correctly 
argued by the Turkel Commission, there is no support in 
international law for the proposition that the control of airspace 
amounts to ‘effective control’ and does not lead ipso facto to the 
designation of an area as “occupied.”153  As Professors Avi Bell and 
Dov Shefi further clarify, there simply is no definitive example in 
international law for air space control that has amounted to 
“effective control” within belligerent occupation law.154  On the 
contrary, the European Court of Human Rights  (ECHR) in 
Bankovic v. Belgium and Others held that NATO’s control over the 
Yugoslavian airspace of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during 
 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 TURKISH NAT’L COMM’N OF INQUIRY, supra note 12, at 82 (offering examples 
of Israel’s continued control of the Gaza Strip’s borders, airspace, and territorial 
seas).  Cf., Carey James, Mere Words:  The “Enemy Entity” Designation of the Gaza 
Strip, 32 HASTINGS INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 643, 654–55 (2009) (explaining that the 
Disengagement Plan grants Israel exclusive authority over Gaza airspace, which 
includes the ability to conduct air strikes from Gaza airspace and control civil 
aviation within Gaza); The Israel “Disengagement” Plan: Gaza Still Occupied, 
PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORG. NEGOTIATION AFF. DEP’T (Sep. 2005), 
http://www.nad-plo.org/etemplate.php?id=85 (detailing Israel’s disengagement 
plan, under which Israel would retain control over Gaza airspace); Saeb Erekat, 
Gaza Remains Occupied, BITTERLEMONS.ORG (Aug. 22, 2005), 
http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/bl220805ed30.html#pal2 (arguing that 
the Israeli disengagement plan will not release Israel from the status of occupier in 
Gaza); Palestinian FM: Pull Out Will Not End Gaza Occupation, THE DAILY STAR, 
Aug. 9, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/Aug/09 
/Palestinian-FM-Pullout-will-not-end-Gaza-occupation.ashx#axzz1cWIcO6Bm 
(conveying the sentiments of the Palestinian foreign minister that, without the 
ability to exercise full sovereignty, Palestine would remain occupied by Israel 
even after Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip). 
153 ISRAELI TURKEL COMM., supra note 13, at 52 (citing Bankovic v. Belgium, 
discussed infra note 158). 
154 See Avi Bell & Dov Shefi, The Mythical Post-2005 Israeli Occupation of the 
Gaza Strip, 16 ISR. AFF. 268, 281 (2010) (arguing that effective control requires 
control of the land of the territory, not just  airspace, water or external borders). 
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the 1999 bombing campaign was in fact not a basis for arguing 
“effective control” within belligerent occupation law.155  Rather 
than conceding the lack of evidence and refraining from making a 
finding on the basis of no previous case law or invoking case in 
law on point, Turkey bases its claims on the inflammatory rhetoric 
that Israel should presumably have been “more aware than most of 
the importance of humanitarian assistance” and that Israel should 
have been aware of the “dangers and inhumanity of ghettos” such 
as with the supposedly occupied Gaza.156 
Fourthly, Turkey argues that Israel’s years-long “inhumane 
Israeli blockade” impinges human rights and supports the 
conclusion that Israel is a belligerent aggressor in Gaza.157  In 
contrast, the ECHR in Bankovic avoided any extraterritorial 
application of the European Convention of Human Rights.158  The 
Court firmly rejected the petitioners’ argument that NATO 
member states had violated their rights by bombing a television 
station.159  Similarly, under existing belligerent occupation 
jurisprudence, Israeli control of crossings into the Gaza Strip—
including closing the strip off at will—does not suggest ipso facto 
that Gaza is occupied. 
 
155 Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 335. The precise implication of 
this holding within the IHL framework remains outside the scope of this article. 
156  Security Council Speech, supra note 12. Additionally, Turkey’s Prime 
Minister declared:  
To those who stand behind this inhuman, this inhuman and illegal 
operation;  
 As much as you stand behind illegality, we stand behind laws. 
 As much as you stand behind the bloody operation, aggressivenes[s], 
behind terror, as much do we stand behind justice.  
 As much as you stand against civilians, against the oppressed in Gaza, 
Palestine as much stand we next to, behind civilians, innocent people, the 
Palestinian people, the people in Gaza. 
Turkish Prime Minister’s Speech, supra note 11. 
157 Security Council Speech, supra note 12. 
158 See Bankovic, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R., at 356–59 (holding that “it is not 
satisfied that the applicants . . . were capable of coming within the jurisdiction of 
the respondent States on account of the extraterritorial act in question”). 
159 Id. at 358–59 (rejecting the petitioners’ argument that “failure to accept . . . 
jurisdiction . . . would defeat the ordre public mission of the Convention and leave 
a regrettable vacuum in the Convention system of human rights’ protection”). 
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Fifthly, scholars have argued that parties should remain 
obligated to international humanitarian law during the postbellum 
transition period, a principle which they would presumably apply 
to Israel while it transfers authority to the legitimate sovereign, 
presumably the Hamas government.160  Application of this legal 
framework to the case of post-disengagement Gaza, however, 
overlooks certain complications.161  First, postbellum obligations 
usually apply to transformative occupations162 and Gaza post-
disengagement is not such an occupation.163  In a transformative 
occupation, an occupying power’s postbellum obligations are 
intended to foster “’public order and civil life’ during and 
immediately after the termination of the occupation and the 
transition to indigenous rule.”164  Yet, this was never Israel’s formal 
intent, especially after Hamas’s brutal takeover of the previously 
Fatah-led Gaza in 2007, in contrast with Israel’s competing policy 
in the Fatah-led West Bank.  Regrettably, nor was it Hamas’s intent 
before or after it took power over Gaza.  For example, in a futile 
attempt to provide economic assistance to Gaza’s agriculture-based 
economy, Israel left greenhouses intact after withdrawal, but 
Palestinian looters subsequently looted and damaged them as 
 
160 See Hamada Zahawi, Redefining the Laws of Occupation in the Wake of 
Operation Iraqi “Freedom”, 95 CAL. L. REV. 2295, 2347–48 (2007) (concluding that a 
jus post bellum legal regime should account for human rights during post-
occupation transitions); Richard P. DiMeglio, The Evolution of the Just War 
Tradition: Defining Jus Post Bellum, 186 MIL. L. REV. 116, 162–63 (2005) (concluding 
that the just war principle should extend to postwar activity and be “morally 
consistent with the initial reasons for going to war”).  See generally Mark J. Allman 
& Tobias L. Winright,  Jus Post Bellum: Extending the Just War Theory, in 53 FAITH IN 
PUBLIC LIFE 241 (2007) (arguing that the just cause principle should guide jus post 
bellum ethics and extend warring parties’ ethical obligations to postwar 
reconstruction). 
161 See, e.g., Shany, supra note 27, at 16–17 (explaining that “the validity of the 
Oslo Accords, and, in particular, of its defunct sovereignty-limiting provisions, is 
very much in doubt”). 
162  See Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of 
War and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 580, 619 (2006) (suggesting that jus post 
bellum may provide “a better basis for handling [transformative occupation]”). 
163 Id. at 592 (noting that scholarship on Israeli-occupied territories focused 
upon Israel’s occupation as ordinary belligerent occupation rather than 
transformative occupation). 
164 Eyal Benvenisti, The Law on the Unilateral Termination of Occupation pt. C, I 
(Tel Aviv Univ. Law Sch., Faculty Working Paper No. 93, 2008), available at 
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1099&context=taulwps 
(citing Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Convention). 
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“police stood by helplessly.”165  An occupant owes an affirmative 
duty both (1) to respect as much sovereignty of an occupied 
population as possible, and (2) to seek their consent in any project 
for reconstruction—assuming consent is achievable.166  Professor 
Dinstein’s argument is, therefore, regrettably immaterial because it 
does not account for such change of eventualities post-
disengagement. 
The duty to respect the sovereignty of a defeated nation167 
provides an additional impediment to maintaining postbellum 
obligations in Gaza after disengagement.  Individuals typically 
regard this separate duty as a gradual process of attaining 
independence.  With Gaza, Israel has strongly opposed any 
declaration recognizing Hamas as the de facto government or even 
recognizing some degree of de facto Palestinian-Gaza 
independence.  Similarly,  the Oslo Interim Accords between Israel 
and the Palestinian Authority do not agree on such deviation.  This 
also occurred on at least two other occasions prior to 
disengagement.  First, as the Palestinians stressed throughout the 
Oslo Interim Agreement negotiations, the Gaza Strip and the West 
Bank constituted one territorial unit.  Consequently, Israel has 
implied that any withdrawal from only one of the two territories 
could not affect the overall unit’s legal status per se; therefore, such 
a withdrawal, Israel reasons, would not grant unilateral Palestinian 
sovereignty over the Palestinian territory or parts.168  That is, Israel 
posits that the status of the unit would not be changed by any 
Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian population centers, including 
 
165 See Looters Strip Gaza Greenhouses, MSNBC (Sept. 13, 2005, 10:25:07 PM), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9331863/ns/world_news-
mideast_n_africa/t/looters-strip-gaza-greenhouses/ (detailing the extensive 
looting of Gaza greenhouses and stating that “roughly 30 percent of the 
greenhouses suffered various degrees of damage”). 
166 Gary Bass has opined that the jus post bellum criteria should include: the 
conduct of war crimes trials, compensatory reparation, and the duty to respect the 
sovereignty of the defeated nation and to seek their consent in any project for 
reconstruction.  See generally Gary J. Bass, Jus Post Bellum, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 384 
(2004) (outlining Bass’s perceived core criteria to jus post bellum).   
167 See Bass, supra note 166, at 392 (“The duty to respect to the greatest extent 
possible the sovereignty of the defeated nation . . . is . . . both an obligation of 
justice and a counsel of political prudence.”). 
168 PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORG. NEGOTIATION AFF. DEP’T, supra note 152 
(discussing Israel’s occupation of the Gaza Strip). 
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the Gaza Strip.169  Secondly, Israel and the Palestinians specifically 
agreed bilaterally in the Oslo Accords that the territorial waters off 
Gaza would be included in the territorial jurisdiction of the 
Palestinian Authority.170  In the agreement, however, Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority wholly excluded the external security of the 
Gaza Strip from the Palestinian Authority’s functional jurisdiction, 
which remains an Israeli obligation until a final status 
agreement.171 
To conclude, the second group of arguments which followed 
on the Gaza Flotilla crisis lead to additional legal obscurity with 
the Turkish-led narration of belligerently occupied Gaza absent an 
armed conflict situation.  Turkey’s reasoning is highly debatable on 
four separate grounds.  First, the sanctions approved by Israel 
along with the imposition of a naval and airspace blockade, 
support the conclusion that Israel is a belligerent occupier in 
effective control of the Gaza Strip.  Second, the alleged violation of 
human rights by Israel in Gaza supports the conclusion that Israel 
is a belligerent occupier.  Third, the argument that Israel’s 
obligations under IHL are postbellum obligations—e.g., a 
transition period where authority is transferred to a legitimate 
sovereign in Gaza—is factually and legally unsound.  Fourth, 
Turkey’s stance that the post-2005 Gaza Strip is still an occupied 
territory notwithstanding the possibility that an armed conflict 
exists is self-contradictory. 
 
169 Id. (stating that “the Accords expressly reiterated that the Gaza Strip and 
West Bank will continue to be considered one territorial unit, and that withdrawal 
from Palestinian population centers will do nothing ‘to change the status’ of the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip for the duration of the Accords”). 
170 See Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, Isr.-Palestine, art. 5, 
¶ 1(a), May 4, 1994,  available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process 
/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Agreement+on+Gaza+Strip+and+Jericho+Area.h
tm (agreeing that the territorial jurisdiction, which includes territorial waters, 
“covers the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area territory as defined in Article I, except 
for Settlements and the Military Installation Area”). 
171 Id. art. 5, ¶¶ 1(b) & (3) (reserving sole authority over “external security” 
with Israel).  Furthermore, Article VIII of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement specifically 
states that “Israel shall continue to carry the responsibility . . .  for defense against 
external threats from the sea and from the air . . . and will have all the powers to 
take the steps necessary to meet this responsibility.”  Id. art. VIII, ¶ 1. 
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4. OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL 
ARMED CONFLICTS 
Turkey’s third central claim raised in its U.N. report argues 
that alleged human rights violations perpetrated by Israel in 
Gaza—in the form of a supposed “inhumane Israeli blockade” of 
multiple years—supports the idea that Israel is belligerently 
occupying Gaza.172  In response to Turkey’s allegations, Israel 
issued the Turkel Commission Report, which explained that Israel 
does not fall under the law of belligerent occupation because it 
lacks the ability to enforce order and manage civilian life in the 
Gaza Strip.173  Interestingly, the Turkel Report employed rather 
moderate language.  In comparison, the aforementioned Israeli 
Supreme Court opinion of Al-Bassiouni v. Prime Minister had 
previously employed firmer language in holding that Israel had 
not exercised “effective control” in Gaza.  Indeed, the Turkel 
Report merely reasoned that if Israel actually possessed effective 
control over the Gaza Strip, then it would have had sufficient 
authority to maintain order to protect human rights from within 
Gaza’s shore itself.174  Be that as it may, Israel has rejected the 
application of Turkey’s controversial approach often semantically 
described as “‘human rights law of non[-]international armed 
conflict.’”175 
And so, the Turkish-led position suggests that international 
human rights law should be mandatorily invoked in the non-
 
172 See, e.g., Security Council Speech, supra note 12 (chastising Israel’s 
purported blockade of ships which were described as providing humanitarian aid 
to Gaza).  
173 Id. 
174 The report argued: 
If Israel did indeed have effective control over the Gaza Strip, then it 
would have the power to act as the authority responsible for maintaining 
order in the Gaza Strip.  The Israeli forces would then be able to wait on 
the coast of the Gaza Strip and intercept the vessels there.  In practice, 
however, Israel does not control the coast of the Gaza Strip.  This area is 
under the ‘effective control’ of Hamas. 
THE ISRAELI TURKEL COMM., supra note 13, at 52. 
175 Sandesh Sivakumaran, Re-Envisaging the International Law of Internal Armed 
Conflict, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 219, 235 (2011).  See also generally Francisco Forrest 
Martin, Using International Human Rights Law for Establishing a Unified Use of Force 
Rule in the Law of Armed Conflicts, 64 SASK. L. REV. 347 (2001) (discussing and 
advocating for the use of human rights law in certain components of the law of 
armed conflict). 
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international armed conflict between Israel and Hamas rather than 
merely looking toward international humanitarian law as a 
persuasive authority.176  The “human rights law of non-
international armed conflict” is primarily a construct of scholars 
that has gained heightened support primarily through recent 
scholarship.177  Nonetheless, proponents of Turkey’s position on 
the Gaza blockade have also gradually adopted this scholarly 
construct.178 
Controversial judgments of the ECHR in Isayeva and Isayeva, 
Yusupova and Bazayeva lay in this approach’s backdrop.179  The 
predominant approach adopted by the ECHR was indeed to apply 
human rights law directly to non-international armed conflict, an 
approach that certain academics have subsequently embraced.180 
And yet, as Professor Sivakumaran cautions, “it remains 
unclear whether the ECHR considered the situation in question to 
be an internal armed conflict or, rather, a state of internal tensions 
and disturbances.”181  Additionally, it is not fully certain whether 
the Court applied international humanitarian law or human rights 
law at large.182 
 
176 See, e.g., TURKISH NAT’L COMM’N OF INQUIRY, supra note 12, at 78–81 
(invoking human rights principles in characterizing the blockade as a “collective 
punishment” against the entire Gaza population which is “prohibited under 
international law”).  This position was also adopted in the UNHRC Report “in 
view of the conduct of the IDF on board the Mavi Marmara as well as the conduct 
of the authorities in the aftermath of the operation.”  Human Rights Council 
Report, supra note 17, at 16–18. 
177 See sources cited supra note 175 (citing to scholarship advocating for the 
approach of human rights law of non-international armed conflict). 
178 For an extraterritorial application of human rights law within the Gaza 
context even without an armed conflict or belligerent occupation, see, e.g., 
DeFalco, supra note 104, at 17–22.  
179 App. Nos 57947/00, 57948/00, and 57949/00, Isayeva, Yusupova and 
Bazayeva v. Russia, Judgment of 24 Feb. 2005; App. No. 57950/00, Isayeva v. 
Russia, (Judgment of 24 Feb. 2005). 
180 See, e.g., Gaggioli and Kolb, ‘A Right to Life in Armed Conflicts? The 
Contribution of the European Court of Human Rights’, 37 ISRAEL YRBK HUMAN RIGHTS 
115, 115 (2007) (stating that human rights law is most applicable). 
181  Sivakumaran, supra note 175, at 235. 
182 Professor Sivakumaran refers to multiple contradictory indications 
relevant to this uncertainty in the judgment.  On one hand, the ECHR invoked 
international humanitarian law terms such as “‘legitimate military targets’, 
‘disproportionality in the weapons used’, and ‘illegal armed insurgency’”.  
Sivakumaran, supra note 175, at 235.  On the other hand, it “also referred to ‘law-
enforcement’ and being ‘outside wartime.’”  Id.  
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Turkey’s choice of laws is therefore indeed consistent with this 
frail approach of “human rights law of non-international armed 
conflict.”  In terms of compliance, Turkey’s preferred approach 
might be interpreted to assume implicitly its underlying 
jurisprudential propositions because few rules exist under 
international humanitarian law for regulating non-international 
armed conflict.183  Moreover, international humanitarian law 
suffers from a lack of specificity and is therefore impractical in the 
case of the Israeli-Hamas armed conflict.184 
Turkey’s position outlined in this Article possesses multiple 
shortcomings.  As to human rights norms, the lex specialis 
relationship between human rights law and international 
humanitarian provisions185 supports the assumption that human 
 
183 See supra note 24 and accompanying text (asserting that whether 
international or non-international armed conflict norms should apply to the 
blockade remains open to debate); William Abresch, A Human Rights Law of 
Internal Armed Conflict: The European Court of Human Rights in Chechnya, 16 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 741, 746–50 (2005) (observing the ECHR’s perceived application of 
humanitarian law doctrines to internal conflicts but arguing that doing so is 
difficult due to a current lack of existing humanitarian law standards for internal 
conflicts); Noam Lubell, Challenges in Applying Human Rights Law to Armed 
Conflict, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 737, 746 (2005) (noting that the “IHL treaty law 
dealing with non-international armed conflicts is . . . sparse”). 
184 See Abresch, supra note 183, at 746–47 (“The rationale that makes resort to 
humanitarian law as lex specialis appealing—that its rules have greater 
specificity—is missing in internal armed conflicts . . . .  [T]he humanitarian law of 
internal armed conflicts is quite spare and seldom specific . . . .”); Heike Krieger, A 
Conflict of Norms: The Relationship between Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law 
in the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 265, 274 (2006) 
(noting that the conventions governing internal conflicts lack specificity and 
concluding that humanitarian law is not necessarily “more appropriate for the 
regulation of internal armed conflicts”). 
185 The classical source of this lex specialis relationship derives from a 
pronouncement of the International Court of Justice: 
In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life applies 
also in hostilities.  The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, 
however, then fails to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, 
namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to 
regulate the conduct of hostilities.  
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, 240 (July 8).  See also ICJ Advisory Opinion Concerning Legal Consequences 
of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 43, ¶ 106 (“In order to answer the 
question put to it, the Court will have to take into consideration both these 
branches of international law, namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, 
international humanitarian law.”). 
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rights would only be applied under the laws governing armed 
conflict.  However, even if human rights standards were applied 
separately,186 the United Nations Human Rights Committee has 
declared that they would apply in cases where subjects are under a 
state’s jurisdictional control per Article 2 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.187  The United Nations 
Human Right Committee has deemed belligerent occupation as 
“effective control” under Article 2.188  However, it is debatable as to 
whether Israel is a belligerent occupier in Gaza.  Hence, whether 
Gaza’s citizens may simultaneously invoke international 
 
186 See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 20, at 82 (discussing examples of 
“[d]ivergence between the law of human rights and the law of belligerent 
occupation”); Roberts, supra note 162, at 594 (“The relation between human rights 
law and the laws of war is not just a simple confrontation between the lex generalis 
of human rights and the lex specialis of the laws of war.”); Watkin, supra note 49, at 
1–2, 26–28 (discussing the application of humanitarian law to internal conflict and 
the difficulty of reconciling the two existing legal systems in doing so); see also 
U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency 
(article 4), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001) (discussing the 
role in protecting human rights of Article 4 of the covenant).  For an example of an 
International Court of Justice opinion referring to the separate applicability of 
human rights law, see ICJ Advisory Opinion Concerning Legal Consequences of 
the Construction of the Wall, supra note 43, at 178.  But see, Michael J. Dennis, 
Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and 
Military Occupation, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 119 (2005) (offering a critique of the 
approach adopted in the ICJ Advisory Opinion Concerning Legal Consequences 
of the Construction of the Wall). 
187 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2, Dec. 19, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 172 [hereinafter ICCPR].  See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General 
Comment No. 31 [80]: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on 
States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 
26, 2004) [hereinafter U.N. Human Rights Comm. General Comment No. 31] 
(“State Parties are required by article 2, paragraph 1, to respect and to ensure the 
Covenant rights to all persons who may be within their territory and to all 
persons subject to their jurisdiction”); INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, 
PROCESS: A PROBLEM ORIENTED APPROACH 452 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff et al. eds., 2d ed. 
2006) (noting that Article 2 of the ICCPR requires that “a state must respect and 
ensure the rights of all individuals ‘within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction’”). 
188 The Human Rights Committee has declared that states must ensure the 
protection of: 
Covenant [rights] to anyone within the power or effective control of that 
State Party . . . .  This principle applies to those within the power or 
effective control of the forces of a State Party acting outside its territory, 
regardless of the circumstances in which such power or effective control 
was obtained.   
U.N. Human Rights Comm. General Comment No. 31, supra note 187, ¶ 10. 
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humanitarian law provisions remains questionable.  In other 
words, assuming human rights obligations can extend 
extraterritorially, the determination of whether human rights were 
actually violated during the post-disengagement Gaza blockade 
may be vulnerable to supersession by armed conflict law. 
On the other hand, Israel’s Turkel Report asserts that the two 
normative regimes—namely, (1) armed conflicts law and (2) 
international human rights—“share a ‘common core’ of 
fundamental standards which are applicable at all times, in all 
circumstances, to all parties, and from which no derogation is 
permitted.”189  The report further reasons that, “[s]ince the right of 
the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip to life is addressed in the lex 
specialis that applies [to the blockade], namely the rules of 
international humanitarian law, it is these rules that should be 
applied.”190  By missing on this third cardinal observation 
concerning human rights law, Turkey, and those that share its 
view, have lost a fine opportunity to address Israel’s own approach 
of combining the laws of armed conflicts with “core” human rights 
law.  Taking Israel’s approach into account could have facilitated a 
useful reevaluation of whether Israel did or did not violate laws 
when it instituted the blockade (or possibly siege) by land, air, sea, 
or combination thereof. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Contrary to the positions set forth by Turkey and the UNHRC 
Fact Finding Report, Israel’s Supreme Court and its subsequent 
Turkel Commission Report were correct to assert that international 
humanitarian law applies to an armed conflict between Israel and 
Hamas, notwithstanding the applicability of belligerent occupation 
law in Gaza since the 2005 disengagement. 
Hence, Turkey, numerous other national governments 
(especially Arab ones), leading human rights NGOs, and United 
Nations Organs such as the UNHRC oddly tend to ignore Israel’s 
application of IHL.  As discussed in this Article, these groups also 
implicitly disregard Israel’s right to apply the self-defense doctrine 
of Article 51 in the United Nations Charter. 
 
189 THE ISRAELI TURKEL COMM., supra note 13, at 103. 
190 Id. 
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What is more, their analysis of whether hostilities reached the 
requisite level of intensity required for the blockade to be deemed 
an armed conflict falls short.  Additionally, their assessment fails to 
provide sound evidence.  Moreover, even if hostilities rose to the 
degree and level required to be classified as an armed conflict in an 
occupied territory, the occupying power would remain restricted 
to its powers under the law of belligerent occupation.  
Consequently, Israel would not necessarily have to comply with 
the component of jus in bello that applies to active hostilities. 
It is ironic that this overall assertion effectively safeguards 
Israel against potentially meaningful critique over its debatable 
siege policies in Gaza.  Regrettably, Turkey’s loss of a fine 
opportunity to avoid this consequence through its report of the 
events to the United Nations is also the loss of the rule of 
international law.  Yet, ultimately it is Israel’s loss—as well as the 
loss of its Palestinian counterparts—toward the effort for peace 
and justice.  
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